Three implications of learning behaviour for price processes. by RAU-GöHRING, Matthias et al.
Department of Economics
Three Implications of Learning Behaviour 
for Price Processes
Matthias Rau-Göhring
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute
Florence, October 2007 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
























Three Implications of Learning Behaviour 











Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of  
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Jury Members: 
 
Klaus Adam, University of Frankfurt 
Michael J. Artis, Supervisor, Manchester University 
Ronald MacDonald, University of Glasgow 
Karl Schlag, European University Institute 
 
© 2007, Matthias Rau-Göhring 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or 
transmitted without prior permission of the author 
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11573Meinen Lehrern Wolfgang Schoppet (†) und Eberhard Simon.
Silence invades the breathing wood
Where drowsy limbs a treasure keep,
Now greenly falls the learned shade
Across the sleeping brows
And stirs their secret to a smile
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"... we are always searching for something hidden or merely potential or hypothetical, following its traces whenever they
appear on the surface." Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium (1986)
0.1 Introductory Remarks
We would certainly support the argument that economic modelling has to conceptualize
in a way which is not a mirror image of reality. Especially those bids of an economic model
which are unobservable are refutable in an isolated case. And model agents are not real agents
at all and so the economists￿interpretation of their models is not directed to a proper target.
While tractability and parsimony should be guiding principles in (economic) modelling,
however, prior to setting up an economic model, economists presumably try to get some
sense of how real agents, whose behaviour they are trying to explain, are actually motivated.
Model-building in economics has a serious intent if only if it is ultimately directed towards
telling us something about the real world and therefore it has to be the role of any social
scientist to interpret reality in a meaningful scienti￿c way. This has been brought forward
notably by the seminal publication of Samuelson (1947), according to whom a theory is ￿a
set of axioms, postulates, or hypotheses that stipulates something about observable reality￿ .
However, the underlying paradigms of economic theory are often not helpful in explain-
ing central questions or economic phenomena. One of these conspicuous blemishes is the way
expectations formation processes are modelled. With its assumption of rational, self-seeking
individuals, economic theory leaves out of account the economic consequences of variations
in attitude, value, culture, ideology, collective behaviour or institutional restrictions. While
it is impossible to come up with a sensible meta-model for expectations formation, a thor-
ough model should contain both a sub-model of information acquisition as well as one of
the learning process. But in the bow wave of the rational expectations revolution, the ex-
pectations formation process was washed away and marginalized in the solution process of
the intertemporal optimization problem. On the other hand, an accurate model of expecta-
tions formation lies beyond the reach of economic science. In his complexity, the economic
agent is essentially unpredictable. But this does not imply that patterns of his behaviour
are indiscernible, as otherwise there could be no social science at all.
0.2 Friedman (1953) and its Repercussions
The roots of the standard modelling approach of expectations formation in economics
can be seen in Milton Friedman￿ s (1953) book on positive economics. Laying down the funda-
mental di⁄erences between normative and positive approaches to economics, it is Friedman￿ s
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idea that assumptions do not need to be realistic in order for theory to be both predictive
and relevant. While o⁄ering no clear de￿nition of the term ￿assumptions￿ , he recommends
to regard them just as some ￿ as-if￿statement and not as a realistic account.
Friedman￿ s (1953) line of argument basically combines two strands of the literature,
namely the inexactness-literature of John Stuart Mill (1836) and Karl Popper￿ s (1935) fal-
si￿cationist methodology. Mill￿ s idea of economics as a ￿ separate and inexact science￿(see
Blaug (1980)) sets the methodological ground for ignoring behavioural aspects, as economics
can per se not yield accurate predictions of the behaviour of individuals. Although Friedman
(1953) does not make any direct reference to Popper￿ s work, it is the ￿test of the validity of
a hypothesis￿which is at the center of his focus. Blaug (1978) elaborates that Friedman￿ s
(1953) work is Popperian, not only in character: Prediction is a means of testing the relation
of a statement and reality, prediction is the sole criterion of verity and the only instrument
of falsi￿cation.
But as Redman (1991) states, Popper￿ s philosophy did not see falsi￿cation as a demar-
cation criterion rather than a trial-and-error-learning, where you make progress only if you
learn from mistakes. Popper, who can be regarded as having been most in￿ uential on main-
stream economic methodology, adapted the principle of veri￿ability of the Logical Positivists
and replaced it with his principle of ￿ falsi￿ability￿serving as the distinction between science
and non-science. But Popper (1960) had a much broader research agenda in mind than just
testable empirical statements: Following the contribution of Marschak (1943), the method-
ological aim should ￿rst and foremost be scienti￿c and not practical in the sense to produce
immediate economic policy responses. The numerical aspect with hypothesis testing is only
the means in the endeavour to build a coherent economic theory. Only indirectly, the quan-
titative aspects will lead to practical consequence. But how well does this apply to economic
theory, where probabilistic arguments matter?1
Popper (1960, p. 140-1) also nourishes the hypothesis of the rational man. ￿There are
good reasons [...] for the belief that concrete social situations are in general less complicated
than concrete physical situations. For in most social situations, if not in all, there is an
element of rationality. Admittedly, human beings hardly ever act quite rational (i.e. as
they would if they could make the optimal use of available information for the attainment
of whatever ends they may have) but they act, none the less, more or less rationally [...].￿
Economists have learned to see their own activities through the methodological eyes of
Friedman and Popper. Many fundamental economic principles, such as those of expectations
1Note that a theory that makes only probabilistic predictions cannot be strictly falsi￿ed by any run of its
alternative outcomes.
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formation, have been tested empirically with the aim to be falsi￿ed by empirical observa-
tions. However, by the standards of Popper, there is nothing like ￿epistemological certainty￿
(Redman (1991)). Moreover, Popper (1960) claims that verifying a model does not increase
its chances of being true. Therefore any empirical foundation of any science is refutable: We
can never know for certain.
0.3 Wither Positivism?
The positivist philosophy of science leaves us with important insights about a possible
procedure, but it rests upon shaky foundations: If you look at the empirical implications,
falsi￿cation has to be implementable and operational, which in many cases - especially once
dealing with individuals￿expectations - will prove an impossible undertaking. So what is it
that economic methodology might improve upon compared to one of its main pillars?
Already Mises recognized that every method (belonging to the realm of epistemology)
presupposes some explicit or implicit conception of reality (ontology), at least to the extent
that the nature of reality is such that it can be the object of knowledge: knowledge is
necessarily knowledge of something. That is to say that the episteme as well as the methods of
the natural sciences entails certain ontological presuppositions that bear on under what kind
of conditions their usage is appropriate. But opponents of ontological arguments argue that
it is impossible for any human being to derive knowledge about reality which is inaccessible
to empirical investigation. Therefore, it is also impossible to derive any ultimate evidence.2
In our point of view, a pinch of Thomas Kuhn￿ s methodology could prove useful. As
stated by Kuhn (1962), each discipline has unexamined postulates, core beliefs, which es-
tablish the ontology of the science and set the standards for judging its knowledge claims.
Therefore, each discipline is bounded and de￿ned by a particular system of perceptions em-
bodied in a set of theories, hypotheses, techniques and assumptions, which he summarizes
as the ￿ paradigm￿of a system (Solo (1991)). These paradigms are regarded as the accurate
model of scienti￿c behaviour, at least in any positivist aproach. But if observed behav-
iour does not obey our (core) paradigms, are we then able to state that epistemological
assumptions (i.e. everything derived from the conception of knowledge) should be down-
graded compared to ontological assumptions (that is, assumptions that are concerned with
the known world and the knowing agent), as the former are con￿ned by their respective
irrefutable paradigms?
Ontological arguments are made for what we would called ￿perennial reality￿ , while
2One should note that this argument is already contradictory, as it entails knowledge which is inaccessible
to empirical analysis.
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epistemological arguments are used in ergodic environments where agents have cognitive
limitations that prevent them from using or analyzing (historical) data appropriately. But
the cognition of reality remains fuzzy, once uncertainty enters.3 Uncertainty implies that
any action chosen implies a distribution of outcomes and these distributions overlap. This
renders any attempt for maximization, which is nicely put forward by Keynes (1936, p.
162-3), who notes that ￿[w]e are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions a⁄ecting
the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical
expectations since the basis for making such calculations does not exist [...].￿
While epistemic theories are not interested in what we called perennial reality, ontological
theories ignore knowledge-related issues. But uncertainty is faced by exactly both features
and reducing uncertainty has be mirrored in agents￿behavioural assumptions. Only with the
interplay of both concepts we can imagine economic agents which not only know or think,
but who are able to learn and to create new knowledge.
We therefore truly believe that the reality of economics cannot be that of an never-
ending sequence of falsi￿cations or empirical discards. The economic discipline needs to
recognize that ontological themes (e.g. rationality principle, maximization principle, focus
on equilibrium phenomena) are rarely revealed and important ingredients of economic models
are presupposed without being credited appropriately. Let us give three examples. Building
an economic theory has become synonymous with mathematical modelling. For Lawson
(2003) this proves to be one of the main fallacies of modern economics. He sees a kind
of ontological indi⁄erence which needs to be reversed. But how should we be able to take
this ontological turn to approach (objective) knowledge? We certainly do not propose to
give up mathematical modelling in economic theory, which has been the major milestone
within modern economic history. A second example has to do with the neoclassical focus on
equilibrium. While equilibrium is rarely interpreted as a rest point of a dynamic process,
considering the dynamics and the real e⁄ects of out-of-equilibrium behaviour however, has
only been rarely studied (Jean-Michel Grandmont being among the staunchest advocates
here). It is especially the discipline of game theory that tries to advance in said respect and
the economics discipline should have a close look at results achieved there.
Before proceeding with possible ontological foundations, let me come up with a third
example (modi￿ed from Brenner (1999)) which is able to summarize our argument. Consider
that agents follow an investment decision according to Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin￿ s capital
3Knight (1921) distinguishes between risk and uncertainty: The di⁄erentiation depends on whether prob-
ability estimates are or are not calculable on the basis of objective instances. This di⁄erence was later picked
up by Keynesian theorists. Also Lucas (1977) states that only in situations of risk the behavioural aspects of
Muth￿ s rational expectations hypothesis make sense, while in situations of uncertainty economic reasoning
will be of no value.
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asset pricing model (CAPM): Under the assumption that risk averse investors maximize
their expected utility, building an e¢ cient portfolio which minimizes the unsystematic risk
is they way investors should proceed. Lets assume that traders and investors are trained in
this respect and behave accordingly without reference to other tools of investment decisions.
We have then transformed an initially normative problem into a positive one, which works
if and only if people have con￿dence in the validity of the investment rule. But this is not
the whole story, as the ontological argument is missing: People need to be capable in doing
so and need to meet the cognitive abilities. But these are con￿ned within the frame of
the CAPM and no ontological discovery can take place here, leaving aside other potentially
relevant investment theories.
Although contemporary economic theory tries to overcome the neoclassical foundations
by clarifying its ontological assumptions, the problem of ontological opacity remains a real
one. It is still di¢ cult to read economists￿ontological commitments o⁄ their models in any
direct or simple way. Economists who routinely assume representative agent economies,4
perfect competition, common knowledge of rationality and the like, would be surprised if
such assumptions were interpreted as a sign of their being committed to the existence of these
phenomena as real features of the world. It was only in the last years that a growing interest
in modelling agents in a heterodox way started. Bounded rationality features, endogenous
preferences, incomplete information etc more or less takes into account that economic agents
cannot be modelled while at the same time renouncing the e⁄ects of institutions, culture,
values and ethical norms.
As mentioned above, the ontological prerequisites of the methods of mathematical mod-
elling used are rarely questioned or even acknowledged, at least not in any systematic or
sustained way. As a result, the possibility of a lack of ontological ￿t (i.e. mismatch of
the presuppositions of these modelling methods with those features of social reality being
investigated) is not considered.
Ontological analysis reveals human beings to be structured and possessed of capacities
that may or may not be exercised. As such, it can sustain the possibility that even if
capacities of calculation are possessed, they may remain unexercised in certain contexts. Of
course, mainstream economists tend to insist that behaviour is everywhere rational in the
calculative sense, i.e. that the relevant capacities are always exercised.
A related example is the presumption that whatever the outcome associated with an
action in one situation, the same outcome will follow from this particular action in all cases.
Ontological analysis, however, reveals ￿social reality￿(cf. Lawson (1993)) to be open, with
4See annex A.
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the likelihood that, in each di⁄erent context a quite di⁄erent array of accompanying causal
forces and conditions will be in play, a⁄ecting the outcome that emerges.
This has fundamental implications with regard to the metaphysical method: it can
never be purely deductive in the sense that one is searching for a distinct and clear insight
as was done by Descartes at the beginning of modern history. However, the way economists
model expectations formation processes is a classic example of deductivism in the aftermath
of Friedman￿ s (1953) in￿ uence. Next to the economic model at hand agents are expected
to have a true data generating process, the existence of some true world that agents just
approach by subjective means. But any kind of subjective cognition and knowledge is rooted
in the existence of some primary reality. There exists only a partial isomorphism between
our subjective world and the real world, and any object or matter is only recognizable for
an agent, if it ￿ts some category of cognition which is discernible for the agent. According
to Kuhn (1962) scientists predict only what is predictable within their ￿respective frame￿ ,
ignoring the predictive failures of established theories, which all too often causes researchers
to speak of anomalies within their discipline (see e.g. Charles Holt￿ s series of anomaly-papers
in the Journal of Economic Perspectives).
Economic action depends to a great extent on plans which are itself based on expecta-
tions, and it is notably this aspect in which most economic models are unconvincing. While
any empirically relevant economic theory needs to have a profound model of expectations
formation, only rarely the issue of expectations formation is tackled at all. All too often, ex-
pectations in economic models are closed just by including a simple mathematical expected
value, leaving aside the three main pillars of expectations formation (see Lewin (1927)),
namely recognition of the environment, and choosing appropriate models for the description
of the model and prediction. Also matters of uncertainty are usually ignored by either as-
suming static expectations, that is asserting that people believe that the environment will
remain unchanged in the future, or perfect foresight, which claims that agents￿beliefs will be
veri￿ed as correct after the decision. These are extreme forms of the ￿rationality postulate￿
(cf. Blaug (1980)), meaning that agents choice depends on complete and transitive preference
orderings, perfect and costless information, and expected utility maximization with correct
probabilistic foundations. The rational expectations hypothesis has been the workhorse of
economic theory since more than three decades by now. While serving as a useful normative
benchmark, it is inherently related to what can be described as the ￿ stream of positivist
thought￿initiated by Friedman (1953). With its assumption of unbounded rationality, it is
a direct heir of the 18th century episteme of classical physics but has little to do with an
ontologically based approach.
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0.4 A Brief Historical Overview of Rational Expectations
In the considerations of classical economics since Adam Smith, expectations and opinions
of economic agents did not have a signi￿cant role. Classical economists inquired into ￿natural
laws￿as determining factors of the economy, having in mind some pre-stabilized harmony
or even a predetermined course of events. Therefore, expectations and uncertainty about
future events did not play a (major) role in their considerations.
These methodological presumptions were inherited by the neoclassical school, which was
chie￿ y interested in equilibriumstates of the economy, in which optimality of utility and pro￿t
maximization ought to be given. For example, Walrasian economics has been predominantly
concerned with equilibrium end-states demonstrating under which conditions e¢ ciency in
the allocation of economic goods is to be obtained. Neoclassical economists moved the
axiom of a homo oeconomicus in the center of their image of man: Having complete market
overview, the homo oeconomicus did not need to cope with uncertainty and expectations
either. Instead he solely focuses on his self-interest, separates preferences and constraints
and behaves rational/optimal.
It was not before the contributions of the Stockholm School (notably Myrdal and Lind-
hal) and Pigou (1929) that expectations entered into economic research. It was Hayek (1937,
p. 41-2) who ￿rst treated equilibrium conditions in expectations in terms of an ￿expecta-
tional equilibrium￿ , in which expectations are correct. He can thus be seen as a precursor
of the seminal contributions of Muth (1960, 1961). In the quarter century in between these
publications, modelling expectations formation was at the forefront of economic research
and tackled by all main economic schools. Tinbergen, Keynes, Hicks, Harrod, Shackle and
Morgenstern are just the most prominent economists who studied expectations formation
extensively, leaving adaptive processes and cobweb phenomena as the major results from ex-
pectations research, also because of a convenient econometric transformation due to Koyck
(1954).
Muth (1960, 1961) ￿rst introduced the concept of rational expectations in a meaningful
and precise way. But it was not until the early 1970s that rational expectations features were
widely acknowledged and ￿rst included in macroeconomic models (Lucas (1972) and Sargent
(1973), independently of each other). Rational expectations implied that expectations about
future values of a variable should respond to changes in exogenous variables which itself
a⁄ects the equilibrium values. Economic policy instruments are meant to be among these
exogenous factors, s.t. policy changes should be re￿ ected in changes of agents￿behaviour.
But rational expectations has not been an unambiguous concept. Many people have
criticized the rational expectations hypothesis on the basis that some of the assumptions
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used in rational expectations models are inconsistent with real world observations. However,
even Muth (1961, p. 317) himself claimed that the rational expectations hypothesis ￿does not
assert that the scratch work of entrepreneurs resembles the system of equations in any way;
nor does it state that predictions of entrepreneurs are perfect [...].￿Nevertheless, critics of
the rational expectations formation approach almost universally picked on its adequacy with
respect to real world expectations formation (being thus an anti-positivist, anti-Friedman
approach). But do assumptions in economic theory need to be perfectly realistic, in order
to be appropriate?
In our point of view, the basic fallacy of the rational expectations approach is di⁄er-
ent and relates more to Aristotle￿ s claim that ￿it is the mark for an educated man to look
for precision in each class of things just as far as the nature of subjects admit￿(Aristotle
(1969, book I,2). Prior to the monetarist and new classical counter-revolutions, the prob-
lem of expectations formation was at the forefront of economic research and tackled by all
main economic schools. Since the introduction of an equilibrium concept for expectations,
the monistic claim for the rational expectations hypothesis has been detrimental to various
strands of the economic literature as it marginalized one of the crucial aspects of economic
behaviour. In a way the rational expectations hypothesis is not even a theory of expecta-
tions formation, as it denies the expectations formation process to matter. According to
Benjamin Friedman (1979), rational expectations lack ￿a clear outline of the way in which
economic agents derive the knowledge which they then use to formulate expectations￿ . As
mentioned above, a proper model of expectations formation should not be mute about the
way information acquisition and learning is handled.
A second strand of criticism focuses on the predictive aspects of rational expectations
models. In fact, rational expectations modelling has been only moderately successful in
explaining certain empirical regularities such as the volatility, persistence and certain kind
of trade-o⁄s of macroeconomic variables. This started a considerable literature on tests of
the rational expectations hypothesis, both from an empirical point of view and via survey
studies.
0.5 Testing the Rationality Assumption Directly
Between Muth￿ s original contribution and the early nineties, more than 80 publications
tackled the issue of the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis (Redman (1991)).
The use of survey data to test the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis is widely
used. We will therefore emphasize this strand of literature in the following paragraphs.
Testing the rational expectations hypothesis using survey data implies testing for un-
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biasedness and orthogonality. For foreign exchange markets, Dominguez (1986) can reject
unbiasedness for the USD for the period 1983-85 using MMS data. Orthogonality test have
been carried out by Dominguez (1986), Froot and Frankel (1989), MacDonald and Torrance
(1989) and It￿ (1990). These studies di⁄er by their de￿nition of the set of information avail-
able at time t, but nevertheless their results are similar: The null is rejected for periods
longer than three months in all cases.
These results suggest that the expected exchange rates, as reported in the survey data,
did not fully incorporate all available information and are thus inconsistent with the rational
expectations hypothesis. Jeong and Maddala (1991) translate these results for other survey
data and ￿nd considerable evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis.
Survey data usually exhibit one main characteristic: Heterogeneity. Any survey data
set immediately reveals that expectations have a distribution. There also is a tendency
for dispersion to increase for longer term expectations. We will not discuss this inherent
contradiction of the rational expectations hypothesis any further, as it will be addressed in
annex A.
Conlisk (1996) also surveys data from experimental asset markets, (e.g. Schmalensee
(1976), Plott and Sunder (1988), Marimon and Sunder (1993)). Apparently these contri-
butions favour adaptive processes over rational expectations, but under suitable conditions
experienced agents may converge towards rational expectations.
Lovell (1986) surveys empirical studies of the rational expectations hypothesis. He con-
cludes that there is only weak support of the validity of rational expectations. He conjectures
that this might be due to various reasons, including measurement errors and learning be-
haviour on behalf of the agents.
The presented evidence of tests of the rational expectations hypothesis is as clear on
its rejection as it is unclear on the implications that the economics discipline should bring
about. Carroll (2003) forcefully criticizes that despite the availability of historical data on
expectations formation, there have been only very view attempts to model the expecta-
tions formation process constructively (Roberts (1998), Branch (2004) being two of the view
exceptions). Manski (2004) emphasizes the same problem and poses the quest for ￿basic
research on expectations formation￿ . This translates into basic questions of knowledge and
belief, where non-basic beliefs ought to be epistemologically justi￿ed. We are then back in
the epistemological trap of testing over and over again but not venturing in a meaningful
ontological way. The problem is that the method or process whereby agents gain their knowl-
edge is unknown. But there is no reason to believe that this process or human behaviour in
general is guided solely by some ￿abstract laws￿ .
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0.6 Is There a Case for Bounded Rationality?
Not all behaviour makes sense, some of it is even unreasonable. But if one is prepared
to drop the rational expectations assumption, the door to behavioural wilderness is wide
open. In order not to get lost, relaxing the assumption of perfect rationality has to be done
in a constructive way. Bounded rationality, as ￿rst noted by Herbert Simon in the 1950s,
can be regarded as such a way out of our dilemma. In most if not all cases the expression
￿ bounded rationality￿is used to denote the type of rationality that agents resort to when the
environment in which they operate is too complex relative to their limited mental abilities.
But there is no unique way of modelling these limits in agents￿capabilities or their rationality
bound.
Simon￿ s notion of bounded rationality is deeply rooted in psychological theories of human
behaviour, and one might wonder if economics should not completely dispense with its
highly unrealistic homo oeconomicus in favour of the more plausible description provided by
behaviourism.5 As is often the case, this probably depends on the circumstances. Simon￿ s
original aim was to analyze complex decision procedures in major businesses, and here it is
the motivation of the single employee, or the question of how to simplify every-day procedures
with the help of routines that become the focus of attention. In the presence of asymmetric
or incomplete information, where humans fail to grasp the complex details, behaviour guided
by rules becomes sensible, and should extend the standard economic theory of rationality.
What should be done, therefore, is to try to select the constraints most appropriate to the
problem at hand, and then to decide whether the homo oeconomicus approach will su¢ ce
or whether it should be amended or modi￿ed.
We can see that Simon emphasized that economics should not disregard the rules govern-
ing human behaviour. But in contrast to neoclassical assumptions, humans were not able to
take into account all possible alternatives, to accurately calculate their expected outcomes,
and to evaluate these outcomes consistently (see, e.g. Simon (1957)). Agents are unable to
optimize, and instead are guided by routines and are content with satisfactory outcomes.
Thus, the maximizing agent was replaced by a satis￿cing agent, who makes use of aspiration
levels to ￿nd a suitable choice.
Selten￿ s notion of bounded rationality takes a slightly di⁄erent course. Human capabili-
ties of computation and cogitation impose cognitive limits on rationality. However, cognitive
limitations are not the only limits of the human mind. In his 1998 presidential address to
the European Economic Association, Selten (1998) basically identi￿es three relevant as-
pects of mental processes for human behaviour: motivation, adaptation and cognition, while
5See also annex B.
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motivation is the primary source. Selten￿ s main procedural advance is the so-called ￿ learning-
direction-theory￿(see Selten and St￿cker (1986)). Being in its character similar to reinforce-
ment learning, the basic idea of this theory is that agents adapt their behaviour towards the
direction in which their payo⁄ improves, according to most recent experiences.
In his work with Gigerenzer (see Gigerenzer and Selten (2002)), the theory of ￿ proba-
bilistic mental models￿is highlighted, being basically a subjective probability-based model
of choice. It says that inferences about the true state of the world are based on probabilistic
hints, combining three strands of literature: Inductive inferences with respect to the envi-
ronment of the agents, satis￿cing-type of decision making, and probabilistic assessments of
frequencies.
In most if not all cases discussed by Simon or Selten, the expression ￿ bounded rationality￿
is used in combination with complexity arguments relating to agents￿limited mental abilities.
This observation motivated Albin (1998) who puts complexity at the center of the bounded
rationality approach. Building on G￿del￿ s theorem6, Albin (1998) draws a rather pessimistic
picture of bounded rationality. According to him, most economic scenarios lie beyond the
range of economic calculus as there are no invariant laws that govern economic systems
which makes rational decision making futile. Therefore, the economics discipline should
abandon its aspiration ￿to predict the unpredictable￿ .7 Instead, measures of complexity of
economic systems should be derived in order to derive the factors that contribute or give rise
to complexity in the ￿rst place. According to Albin (1998), building appropriate taxonomies
of complexity-related characteristics of models is therefore vital for any modelling attempt.
Sargent (1993) can be regarded as a milestone in the bounded rationality literature,
introducing main concepts of learning behaviour and deriving applications for macroeco-
nomic models for the ￿rst time in a concise way. Sargent states that ￿[t]he elementary
object of analysis in rational expectations models and models of bounded rationality is a
collection of decision rules, namely, functions mapping people￿ s information into decisions.
Rational expectations restricts those decision rules by adopting the assumptions of indi-
vidual optimization and consistency of perceptions. Bounded rationality drops at least the
second of these assumptions, and replaces it with heuristic algorithms for representing and
updating decision rules.￿Sargent, being one of the protagonists of both the rational expec-
tations literature and least-squares learning approaches, proposes to model economic agents
as econometricians. This "adaptive learning approach" has nice behavioural aspects and
6By G￿del￿ s theorem, in any su¢ ciently rich logic some stateable theorems (and indeed, some true the-
orems) can neither be proved true or false. Moreover, in such logics, no general procedure can be devised
that will decide whether any particular question that is presented is decidable.
7Note the similarity of Albin￿ s (1998) argument to John Stuart Mill￿ s notion of economics as an inexact
science.
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typically assumes that agents have to estimate unknown parameters. However, it is also a
bounded rationality approach as during the learning process the economic model at hand is
usually misspeci￿ed. We will discuss this approach in the next section.
Other approaches impose bounded rationality at a more primitive level (Mankiw and
Reis (2002), Branch et al. (2004) to mention just two relatively recent contributions) by
concentrating on particular rules-of-thumb, a literature disregarded in this chapter. We
also disregard an important and considerable theoretical literature, namely that on game
theoretical learning concepts such as imitation and evolutionary approaches. For an overview
see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
But in spite of their neat behavioural interpretations and empirical or psychological
backing, are bounded rationality models useful in economic theory? The answer is: it
depends. From an empirical point of view, the full reduced-form of a dynamic model may
entail a very large number of parameters and estimation of these parameters might be futile
given the required degrees of freedom. Adaptive learning with bounded rationality features is
therefore a tractable, less complex alternative which guarantees simple but plausible decision
rules. On the other hand we have to ask ourselves whether there are any e⁄ects of bounded
rationality and learning behaviour on market outcomes, that is whether bounded rationality
approaches make a di⁄erence, and if yes, under which circumstances these di⁄erences show
up.
0.7 The Quest for a Learning-Based Solution
Whether the epistemic or the ontological perspective is more suitable to economics,
remains an open question. However, we have seen that the rational expectations hypothesis,
despite being technically neat and convincing from an equilibrium point of view, is not a
sensible measure in many markets and can be applied with great care only. According to
Krugman (1998), rationality is a modelling device rather than a principle. It should be
abandoned in cases in which it is not conducive to solutions of empirical regularities. In
this thesis, therefore, we try to identify three aspects in which this traditional neoclassical
approach fails to explain empirical regularities or anomalies. We will argue that in the cases
under consideration, learning behaviour can be regarded as a worthwhile ontological venture,
being a road still very little traveled by.
But how should one best model learning behaviour? Learning behaviour in di⁄erent
economic contexts cannot be modelled in a unique way. If one is interested in learning in
speci￿c contexts, a taxonomy of the situations at hand is key. The dominant paradigm is
to endow individuals with learning rules which lead to optimizing behaviour in the long
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run/asymptotically. These learning models are generally normative principles rather than
attempts to describe how economic agents really learn. For the latter purpose other models
such as those of learning based on psychological research or evolutionary theories are more
appropriate.8
The literature on rational expectations learning is often classi￿ed according to whether
the agents are fully rational or boundedly rational. Fully rational learning takes place when
agents know the model speci￿cation well enough to learn by estimating the parameter values
consistently. This learning typically takes place via Bayes￿Rule. Starting with a prior belief,
agent i updates his beliefs once new information becomes available according to
P
i (￿ j I) =
P i (I j ￿)P i (￿)
P i (I)
;
where ￿ are the parameter values to be estimated and I is new information available.
While it is a standard and almost natural way to handle imperfect information situations,
Bayes￿Rule is also a practical means in cases of asymmetric information in which one agent
tries to learn about the beliefs of other agents. Being a normative concept about how to
revise prior beliefs, Bayesian learning is the only rational procedure to update these beliefs
and to derive consistent posteriors.
While being such a strong normative and theoretical claim, Kahneman et al. (1982)
provide evidence for the refutation of Bayesian updating. Already Edwards (1968) showed
that individuals react ￿conservatively￿towards new information available, meaning that the
actual revision of posterior beliefs lags behind. Kahneman et al. (1982) quali￿ed this result
by showing that by Bayes￿Rule the more reliable new information is, the larger should be
its impact on the posterior beliefs. However, they cannot show that this phenomenon is not
given empirically. Also prior probabilities, which should matter in Bayesian updating, do
not seem to in￿ uence decision making (much). El-Gamal and Grether (1995) derive similar
result.
But if Bayesian learning (i.e. rational learning) has only limited empirical support, how
should agents choose their learning procedures when they lack the information and capabil-
ities necessary to make a fully rational choice? Bounded rationality can take many di⁄erent
forms and yield many di⁄erent results. If such a route should be followed, economic theory
cannot establish those bounds on rationality on an ad hoc basis. It seems inescapable that
boundedly rational learning requires explicit modelling of the institutional and informational
8In all our cases learning means ￿ learning the model￿ . A di⁄erent approach to learning are behavioural
models in the spirit of Cyert and March (1963). The distinctive mark of this literature is that agents require
much less information than is commonly assumed in rational, even boundedly rational learning models.
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environment of economic agents. We can also conject that the optimal procedure will depend
on how costly errors are and how easily they can be corrected.
The unattractive prior information assumptions of fully rational models have made the
concept of bounded rationality more widely accepted as a starting point for models of ratio-
nal expectations learning. In recent years, an increasing number of economists has come to
use the expression ￿adaptation￿in the context of learning. They understand learning as a
process by which individuals try to adapt their behaviour to the (changing) situations they
face. The principle motivation of this kind of learning is to ￿nd an adequate or satisfactory
behaviour under given circumstances. Such a concept is adequate if we assume that individ-
uals have only limited knowledge about the world they live in and try to make the best use
of their limited knowledge. From this perspective the concept of adaptive learning has some-
thing in common with the concept of bounded rationality (see e.g. Sargent (1993)). The
assumption of omniscience, characterizing most of the economic literature, is abandoned.
Instead, individuals are assumed to have only partial knowledge about the situation they
face.
Note that adaptive learning, like Bayesian learning, excludes any cognitive creativity
of agents. They are assumed to choose from a given set of alternatives only, and after
each decision they adapt their behaviour to newly provided information. The creation of
new alternatives, i.e. the cognitive development of strategies, is not considered by adaptive
learning models.
Agents are assumed to have some reasonable initial belief about the model or equilibrium
but lack information needed to guarantee consistent estimation. Agents have perceived laws
of motion, represented by a parameter vector ￿. This perceived law of motion usually nests
the rational expectations equilibrium solution ￿, so the departure from rational expectations
modelling is not as great as one might imagine.
Agents are boundedly rational because they do not initially know ￿ and they attempt
to learn this REE solution using an adaptive inference process. Using their perceived law
of motion, agents form expectations which enter into the model￿ s reduced-form equations
in lieu of rational expectations. The result is an actual law of motion consisting of a map
(T-map), from the perceived law of motion to the actual realizations of the variables agents
are attempting to forecast. We can brie￿ y introduce this by assuming a reduced-form




where yt￿1 is the vector of observable shocks.
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Let the rational expectations equilibrium be given by
xt = a + byt￿1 + ￿t;
where a = (1 ￿ ￿)













: Consider agents having a perceived law of
motion according to
xt = ￿
0e yt￿1 + ￿t;






Inserting this forecast in the reduced-form equation above and solving for xt gives us the
actual law of motion, namely
xt = (￿ + ￿a) + (￿ + ￿b)
0 yt￿1 + ￿t;












Evans and Honkapohja (2001) de￿ne the actual law of motion as the "stochastic process
followed by the economy if forecasts are made under the ￿xed rule given by the perceived
law of motion".
Referring to this adaptive inference process, it seems that most agents use commonly
accepted econometric estimation methods in their learning, typically least-squares regression
models. In statistical learning models, in which information arrives in each period indepen-
dent of the actions of the decision maker and the economic environment is stationary, an
agent eventually obtains all available information and his actions are optimal given this in-
formation. Therefore, under rather mild regularity conditions these models will converge to
REE where the expectations of the agents will be veri￿ed by the outcomes, apart from some
residual stochastic noise, from which the learning methods of the agents can extract no fur-
ther information (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) on a review of expectational stability).
Marcet and Sargent (1989) apply Ljung￿ s (1977) theorem to the learning problem of self-
referential rational expectations models, in the sense that the actual law of motion depends
on the perceived law of motion. To prevent the updating procedure from going outside the
veri￿able attraction areas a projection facility is often needed that prevents outliers from
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throwing the estimation out of bounds. Essentially it is an assumption that learning agents
throw away certain outlier observations. Grandmont and Laroque (1991) criticize the use of
the projection facility, notable in the multiple equilibria context. They deem it contrary to
the spirit of enquiry since it presumes that agents have some consensus on which domain of
attraction to project estimates into. But how could such consensus arise before any learning
has taken place?
The rational expectations equilibrium achieved will be sensitive not only to assumptions
about initial information sets, but also towards the length of memory and how learning
rules weigh past observations, as well as the con￿dence agents have in their (initial) beliefs
about the appropriate models and learning rules. Boundedly rational learning in the shape
of adaptive learning therefore still entails a lot of premises which - at best - only have
limited empirical support. As Salmon (1995) states, "the main problem with these learning
mechanisms is that they lack a behavioural interpretation.￿
Two alternatives to imposing ￿static￿ learning rules are given by Arthur (1994) and
LeBaron (1995), where agents start close to the rationality outcome but are left to decide
on their learning rule. Economic agents then have incentives to eliminate forecast errors up
to the point where the costs of attaining necessary information become larger. Note that
the most readily and least costly available information about the future value of a variable
are its past values. In the absence of structural breaks, econometric models can lead under
fairly general conditions to univariate conditions between the current and past values of a
variable.
What remains important though, is that in a setting, where information is scarce and
localized and behaviour is experimental and testing rather than optimizing, the path followed
by the economy is likely to depend more on the dynamics of the learning process (let it be
rational or boundedly rational) than on any characteristics of a long-run rational expectations
equilibrium of the economy. Therefore, learning behaviour can lead to a better understanding
of transition and equilibrium dynamics.
0.8 Outline of the Thesis
The following three chapters are concerned with the impact of learning behaviour in
di⁄erent economic environments. In all three cases we were particularly motivated by real
world puzzles: The size and persistence of exchange rate volatility, the possibility of ￿nancial
market crashes without news and progress in disin￿ ation in transition countries despite lim-
ited credibility and con￿ icting monetary and ￿scal policies. We introduce learning behaviour
in a particular way in all three cases, trying to be close to "sensible real world behaviour".
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However, we have no reason to assume that our models are comprehensive explanations of
the three markets under consideration. But - in all modesty - we are able to show that
relaxing a standard assumption by factor mu, we are able to get interesting dynamics which
put the models closer to economic reality.
Chapter 1 shows in a simple two-country model that when adding learning behaviour in
which agents discount their knowledge of the past rather heavily, we can end up in a situa-
tion where exchange rate volatility does not settle down, just because of our expectational
assumption. Adaptive learning behaviour thus adds some additional dynamics to the model,
which are not present under full rationality.
Chapter 2 tries to implement adaptive learning behaviour in an empirical model. In
the study of disin￿ ation processes in three eastern European accession countries we add
expectations derived from a recursive learning process to an otherwise standard VAR model.
We can see that di⁄erences in the speed of disin￿ ation can - at least partly - be attributed to
the presence of expectational e⁄ects stemming from learning behaviour. More precisely, in
countries in which learning behaviour is stronger, the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks are
smaller and less pronounced. This certainly has clear implications for any monetary policy
conduct: Credibility and transparency are key mechanisms by which private sector learning
behaviour can be facilitated, which results not only in faster disin￿ ation but also in lower
sacri￿ce ratios.
In chapter 3 we consider a simple investment game, in which agents have incomplete and
asymmetric information in line with the "agreeing-to-disagree" literature (see e.g. Aumann
(1976)). We can show that agents￿valuation of an asset will ultimately be the same, even
though they start from di⁄erent information sets and do not interact directly with each other.
That is, social learning behaviour (i.e. learning from others) can lead to the convergence of
posterior beliefs, which can form the basis for a kind of endogenous market crash which is
not accompanied by any exogenous news.










ON EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND ADAPTIVE
LEARNING BEHAVIOUR
1.1 Introduction
One of the most puzzling characteristics of international ￿nancial markets is the volatility
of ￿ exible exchange rates. It is all the more mysterious as with the end of the Bretton Woods
System many scholars and professional economists believed that a new era of exchange
rate stability would arise. This view was emphasized in the tradition of Friedman￿ s (1953)
argument that an international monetary system with ￿ exible exchange rates should cause
less volatility due to stabilizing speculation. However, this belief did not prove to hold in
reality. Nominal exchange rates have been considerably more volatile, notably in relation to
their relevant fundamentals.
Over the last decades, economists have developed an extensive literature to explain the
existence of these (persistent) exchange rate ￿ uctuations. However, the conclusion from em-
pirical tests of the principal structural models is that none of them adequately explains the
short to medium run dynamics of major exchange rates. The inability to reconcile observed
levels of foreign exchange rate volatility with predictions derived from these principal struc-
tural models remains to be one of the most persistent challenges in international ￿nance.
One aspect in which most structural models are unconvincing is in their treatment of
expectations. As exchange rates should be viewed theoretically as asset prices that re￿ ect -
among other things - expectations of a variety of real and monetary factors, the expectations
formation process about the future exchange rate is a key determinant of current demand
and therefore the current exchange rate. The still dominating paradigm in theories of ex-
change rate determination is that agents have rational expectations as introduced by Muth
(1961) (see e.g. Taylor (1995), and Sarno and Taylor (2002)). Rational expectations models
presuppose that agents have complete knowledge of the fundamental structure of the econ-
omy, they immediately take all available information into account and maximize expected
utility according to an economic model which is common knowledge. As these are rather
demanding conditions, it is not surprising that rationality tests of foreign exchange markets
1
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indicate that full rationality does not seem to be given empirically.1 Instead, the empirical
literature suggests that agents in the foreign exchange (henceforth FX) markets do not use
all available information and therefore structural models based on rational expectations are
likely to be ￿ awed.
In this paper we drop the full rationality assumption and let agents be boundedly ra-
tional. However, we introduce the rationality bound in a rather particular way, namely via
adaptive learning. The literature on learning has shown that convergence to rational expec-
tations, even in highly stylized models, occurs only under very special conditions. Thus, the
theoretical foundations of rational expectations are weak at best.
Instead of assuming that all past data count equally, we make use of a constant gain
learning algorithm that discounts past observations. Constant gain learning is a method of
￿staying alert￿to structural change as it entails a greater sensitivity to more recent obser-
vations which may incorporate shifts in the underlying structure. Constant gain learning,
which is similar to adaptive expectations in that current expectations depend upon some
￿xed proportion of the previous period￿ s forecast error, has not been used in a two-country
setup so far.
While in deterministic models with a su¢ ciently small constant gain parameter conver-
gence to rational expectations can be achieved (Evans and Honkapohja (2001)), constant gain
learning has been typically proposed as a means to induce persistent dynamics in otherwise
converging models (see Sargent (1993), Evans and Honkapohja (1993), Sargent (1999)).2
We are interested in the non-convergence case of the constant gain algorithm. We go
beyond the existing literature by applying constant gain learning to a non-stochastic two-
country overlapping generations (OLG) model. Our model isolates the e⁄ects of the adaptive
learning algorithm and compares the results to the case of rational expectations. We show
that resulting learning equilibria can exhibit volatility that is entirely due to replacing the
rational expectations assumption. In particular we show that the parameter region for
which a monetary equilibrium exists can be divided into regions of convergence and non-
convergence. For the convergence region we derive interesting new stability results: for
su¢ ciently small money growth processes convergence is independent of the size of the gain
parameter. This contrasts with most of the existing literature that derives convergence only if
the gain parameter is su¢ ciently small (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). For the non-
convergence region we show that simulated exchange rate series exhibit statistical regularities
(mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, normality, stationarity) that come closest to
1See also section 1.2
2The only exchange rate model with adaptive learning features known to me is Kim (2003).
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weekly and monthly German mark - U.S. dollar data (1979.1-1998.12). Volatility can thus
emerge in deterministic models simply because expectations show a greater sensitivity to
more recent observations.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 motivates our bounded
rationality approach, describes the relevant literature on rationality in FX markets and
introduces the adaptive learning approach. In section 1.3 the model setup is presented and
the solutions for both the rational expectations and the adaptive learning case are derived.
Section 1.4 presents a simulation exercise of our model under non-convergence and discusses
its implications for the volatility of exchange rates. Section 1.5 derives concluding remarks.
1.2 Motivation and Related Literature
The economics profession has not reached a consensus about the structure and the ap-
propriate set of fundamental factors, notably macroeconomic variables, to be included in
an exchange rate equation. For example, leading structural models such as the monetary
approach, portfolio balance and currency substitution models include domestic and foreign
money supplies, real incomes, interest rates, price levels and balance of payments. Most
models contain also some conditional expectations of the spot exchange rate, based on infor-
mation available at time t. A general macroeconomic model of the exchange rate can thus
be written as
et = G[Ht;Et(et+1 j It)];
where the exchange rate et is a function of the set of fundamental variables Ht and the
conditional expectation of next period￿ s exchange rate given current information It.
The conclusion from the empirical literature on structural models is that none of them
adequately explains short to medium run dynamics for all time periods and exchange rates.
The most profound negative result is Meese and Rogo⁄￿ s (1983) ￿nding that no existing
structural model could out-predict na￿ve random walk forecasts at short and medium hori-
zons (see also Meese (1990) and Cheung et al. (2002)).
1.2.1 Stylized Facts of Exchange Rate Volatility
We focus on the log German mark (DEM) to U.S. dollar (USD) bilateral exchange rate
for the period 1979-1998, to illustrate the quantative importance of historical exchange rate
volatility3 (table 1 in annex I). We make use of weekly, monthly and quarterly end of period
3As it is standard in the FX literature, logarithmic values are used as numeraire conventions are an
important factor favouring logarithmic transformations (as problems arising from Jensen￿ s inequality are
avoided).
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115731.2. MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 4
market rates that are obtained from the Federal Reserve￿ s Statistical Release H.10 (weekly)
and IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics (monthly and quarterly). From ￿gure 1 and
table 1 we can read two salient features: (i) volatility increased tremendously with the end
of the Bretton Woods System, and (ii) volatility increases when we move from weekly to
quarterly data.
The most telling bit of evidence is shown in table 2: No fundamental, neither at monthly
nor quarterly frequency, has a standard deviation even close to that of the nominal exchange
rate, which is not without problems for most structural models using fundamentals.
Many other empirical regularities also remain what they were more than 20 years ago:
Table 3a shows that the hypothesis of normality of the log exchange rate returns can be
rejected at the 1% level for weekly and quarterly data, and at the 5% level for monthly
data. Moreover exchange rate returns exhibit positive skewness at the weekly and monthly
frequency, while being marginally negatively skewed at the 3-month horizon. Exchange rate
returns are leptokurtic (peaked) relative to the normal distribution at weekly and monthly
frequency, while quarterly data are platykurtic (￿ at). This result mirrors the well-established
stylized empirical fact that leptokurtosis becomes less pronounced when proceeding from
weekly to quarterly data. These formal tests are mirrored in ￿gure 2, where the graphs of
the estimated densities all indicate "fat tails" behaviour.
Moreover, table 3b shows stationarity tests for the DEM-USD exchange rate. While the
log spot rates turn out to be non-stationary, the ￿rst di⁄erence is stationary at all frequencies.
This provides support for the use of a constant gain algorithm, as such algorithms are
known to work well in non-stationary environments (see e.g. Sargent and Williams (2005)).
Moreover, constant gain learning rules lack a sharp prior knowledge of the economic structure
and thus re￿ ect well our assumption of boundedly rational behaviour.4
1.2.2 Expectations and Rationality in Foreign Exchange Markets
In a survey Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) conclude that ￿ exchange rates are moved
by factors other than the obvious, observable, macroeconomic fundamentals￿ . Frankel and
Froot (1998) take it even further by stating that ￿ macroeconomics appears to be irrelevant in
explaining high- and medium-frequency exchange rate dynamics for low in￿ ation countries￿ ,
which lets them conclude that ￿ macroeconomics is an inessential piece of the exchange rate
volatility puzzle￿ .
We do not share this opinion but rather suspect that macroeconomic models fail to
4In addition, constant gain learning rules usually give rise to additional learning dynamics not found in
rational expectations equilibria.
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identify the correct expectations formation process instead. In particular, the inability to
reconcile observed levels of foreign exchange rate volatility with predictions derived from
rational expectations models should not mislead us in abolishing macroeconomic approaches
in general. Exchange rate models since the 1970s have emphasized that nominal exchange
rates are asset prices and are in￿ uenced by expectations about the future. It is therefore our
objective to take expectations seriously, as the expectations formation process is key to the
question of variability.
1.2.2.1 E¢ cient Market Hypothesis
In testing the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis, tests of the e¢ cient mar-
ket hypothesis are widely used. The e¢ cient market hypothesis states that asset prices in
￿nancial markets should re￿ ect all available information; as a consequence, prices should
always be consistent with fundamentals.
In an e¢ cient, risk-neutral foreign exchange market, the current forward exchange rate
should be an unbiased predictor of the spot exchange rate at the settlement date of the
forward contract. Tests of the e¢ cient market hypothesis are a joint test of rationality of
expectations and risk neutrality of agents, which is one assumption for the uncovered interest
rate parity to hold. The evidence from the empirical literature (Hodrick (1987)) indicates that
there is strong evidence for a time-varying risk premium. This calls into question whether
agents in the FX market are actually risk neutral.
However, the presence of risk aversion in preferences does not seem to be the whole story.
MacDonald and Torrance (1990) and Lewis (1994) show that the rejection of the EMH is
due to both a risk premium and expectational failures. One therefore has to question, in
which way such expectational failures may be explained.
1.2.2.2 Survey Studies
The use of survey data as a proxy for exchange rate expectations enables us to unravel
the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and risk neutrality. There are two kinds of tests
of the rational expectations hypothesis using survey data. The ￿rst kind, surveyed by Takagi
(1991), tests for unbiasedness and orthogonality in the survey data. Prominent contributions
in that respect are Dominguez (1986), MacDonald (1990), MacDonald and Torrance (1990),
Frankel and Froot (1987, 1989), and It￿ (1990). A useful starting point for their analysis is
equation et+k￿et = ￿+￿Xt+ut+k, where Xt is a set of known information at time t and u is
a zero mean error. Empirically the ￿ coe¢ cient should equal zero for rational expectations.
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115731.2. MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 6
This null is rejected strongly by the authors mentioned above. The results suggest that the
expected exchange rate, as reported in the survey data, did not fully incorporate all available
information and thus is inconsistent with the rational expectations hypothesis.
A second type of rationality test is based on Liu and Maddala (1992) who use the
data set of Frankel and Froot (1989). They extend the above mentioned analysis by using
cointegration techniques as both spot and forward exchange rates and the expected spot rate
are I (1). Testing monthly expectations and spot exchange rate data they are able to show
that the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration is due to both expectational
failures and some degree of risk aversion. This results holds for a wide range of currencies,
including the Swiss Franc, the British Pound and the German Mark.
Sarno and Taylor (2002) conclude ￿ that the true, unknown expectations formation
process used by agents operating in the foreign exchange market is likely to be more complex
than typically assumed [...].￿
1.2.2.3 On Learning and Exchange Rates
The ￿rst one to introduce learning behaviour into a model of exchange rates was Tabellini
(1988). He assumes a simple ￿ exible price monetary model where agents face uncertainty
about a parameter of the model that they try to learn by means of Bayes￿rule. Tabellini
shows that uncertainty about the stochastic process governing the market fundamentals leads
to systematic overestimations of the permanent components of random shocks. Although the
magnifying e⁄ect decreases exponentially as agents￿prior precision increases with increasing
horizon, short run variability of exchange rates is reasonably well explained. Tabellini shows
that the rejection of standard econometric tests on the non-existence of bubbles may be
explained by the dynamics caused by learning behaviour. However, in absence of continuous
structural change, learning e⁄ects and FX market volatility fade out quickly
Lewis (1989) applies a similar framework to the performance of the U.S. dollar in the
early 1980s. She shows that the tightening of the U.S. money supply at that time was not
immediately recognized by the market as a persistent change in monetary policy. Market par-
ticipants instead ￿ learned￿this shift gradually. Her main result is that although exchange
rate forecasts have been systematically wrong ex post, this need not be an argument for irra-
tionality of agents. It is in line with the assumption of Bayesian learning about an unknown
parameter shift in the fundamental process.
Gourinchas and Tornell (2000) try to explain some delayed overshooting features of
the exchange rate by introducing Bayesian learning. In their two-country in￿nite horizon
model, interest rate expectations are the essential factor in exchange rate determination.
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The interest rate di⁄erential between two countries is supposed to consist of the sum of a
persistent and a transitory component, dit = ￿ + di
p
t + ￿t; where ￿ represents a constant,
di
p
t the unobservable persistent and ￿t the transitory component. The persistent component
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, that is i
p
t is assumed to consist of two components:
past persistent shocks and current persistent shocks. The uncertainty agents face is that
they do not know whether a change in the interest rate is caused by a shock in the transitory
or the permanent component. Gourinchas and Tornell (2000) assume that agents perceive
a relative variance of the two components which is di⁄erent from the true variance. Agents
use Bayesian inference to update their priors. The results of this analysis are that the model
is capable of explaining the delayed overshooting pattern as a reaction to monetary policy
shocks that was ￿rst mentioned by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
Bayesian learning, as it is applied by Tabellini, Lewis, Gourinchas and Tornell, is applied
in contexts where the presence of fully rational but not fully informed agents is assumed. This
results in learning processes that vanish quickly and - without the presumption of continuous
parameter shifts - are not able to depict real world exchange rate patterns.
Arifovic (1996) and Arifovic and Gencay (2000) use arti￿cially intelligent agents that
￿ learn￿ by means of a genetic algorithm. Their analysis is embedded in the two-country
overlapping generations (OLG) model of Kareken and Wallace (1981). Agents face cash-
in-advance constraints and use genetic algorithms to update their decisions regarding their
portfolio composition. The resulting equilibria exhibit large and persistent volatility of ex-
change rates.
The genetic algorithm is a simple model of natural evolution. The problem with the
genetic algorithm is that it introduces uncertainty in a rather extrinsic way via mutation.
Moreover the applied ￿tness criterion is an adaptation rather than a learning process.
A more plausible assumption is that agents act like econometricians when doing forecasts
about the future state of the economy. Expectational rules, or perceived laws of motion, of fu-
ture variables are conditioned on current and past information as with rational expectations,
but the relationship between the expectations variable and the information set evolves recur-
sively as a result of expectational errors which are incorporated into econometric procedures
which update coe¢ cients.
Timmermann (1993, 1996), Bullard (1992) and Bullard and Du⁄y (1998, 2001) apply
adaptive learning algorithms to stock market models. Timmermann explains the excess
volatility of stock prices with (self-referential) adaptive learning behaviour, while Bullard
and Du⁄y show the existence of complicated limit dynamics under learning, notably non-
convergence to rational expectations equilibria. All in all, these authors argue that the
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observed volatility in asset markets can be explained by changes in investors￿expectations via
adaptive learning against a background of relatively small changes in economic fundamentals.
Our conjecture is that similar arguments hold also for the FX markets, where one has a
similar discrepancy between sample moments of exchanges rates and economic fundamentals.
1.2.3 Adaptive Learning Behaviour
Models with rational expectations are mute about behaviour o⁄ an equilibrium path.
Likewise, since rational expectations is an equilibrium concept, the process of expectations
formation is left unde￿ned since expectations are assumed to be ful￿lled.
This paper suggests that agents form expectations about future variables in a way that
their beliefs are consistent with the observed realizations in a linear statistical sense. In other
words, it is supposed that agents act like econometricians using linear statistical techniques
and, in doing so, they do not make systematic forecast errors. For example, agents might
compute their expectations from actual time series observations in the past by using least
squares regressions (see Bray (1982), Marcet and Sargent (1989), Bullard (1994) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2001)). We refer to these relatively simple forecasting rules as adaptive
learning rules (see also annex C. on the relationship of adaptive learning and least-squares
estimation).5; 6 As Sargent (1993, p. 22) puts it, "[W]e can interpret the idea of bounded
rationality broadly as a research program to build models populated by agents who behave
like working economists or econometricians".
Learning rules are called adaptive, if agents adjust their forecast rule as new data points
become available over time. The rules usually depend on a single parameter, which describes
how quickly expectations react to present conditions. The parameter then re￿ ects the relative
weight of present observations and of an aggregate index of past observations.
An agent￿ s expectational formation process is completely described by such a forecasting
rule. At each date t, agents ￿t their forecasting rule to the set of past price data. Forecasts of
future price levels are then generated and converted into forecasts of rates of return. Given
these forecasts, agents determine their consumption and savings decisions. Those are optimal
for each agent given the forecasts generated by the forecasting rule at period t.
Let us now have a look at the methodology employed in models of adaptive learning
by considering a simpli￿ed example of the model employed later in this paper. We analyze
5Gans (1995) shows that the paths generated under best reply dynamics are a subset of what is called
adaptive learning.
6Rational learning, instead, is demanding in terms of its informational requirements as it assumes knowl-
edge of the true structure of the economy. Rational learning thus retains the rational expectations equilibrium
assumption at each point in time.
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a standard overlapping generations (OLG) model with non-stochastic money supply. The
economy consists of N identical agents, each living for two periods.7 Agents maximize their
lifetime utility. They receive (perishable) endowments in each period and can decide on the
amount of savings in the ￿rst period. Real money balances are the only means to hold these
savings. There is no production in the economy and money supply is given by a non-constant,
non-stochastic money supply rule.
Consider the agents￿utility function to be de￿ned in the following way:
u(ct;ct+1) = lnct + lnct+1:











!i denotes the endowments in period i, while Mt is money demand at time t: Agents￿












t+1 is the expected rate of return on money holdings.
Deriving the ￿rst order conditions for that maximization problem, we can write individual

















Let the money supply be given by
Mt = ￿Mt￿1;














7It is assumed that generations pass their information about the PLM parameters to the next generation.
Note that under learning, if the recursive system is of order one, then only the information about PLM
parameters in the immediately preceding period needs to be passed along.
8Note that due to Walras￿Law the equilibrium for the good market follows.
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Eliminating the expectations operator from equation (1.1) by applying rational expecta-
tions would leave us with the perfect foresight solution of the economy. Note that the perfect
foresight steady state in that case is given by
p =
2M
N!1 ￿ 2!2: (1.3)
We now posit an alternative forecasting rule for pe
t+1; the agents￿ ￿ perceived law of
motion￿ . This is the equation that they believe is governing the economy. We assume agents
to be reasonably rational in that they understand the basic linear structure of the model.





t + ￿t (pt￿1 ￿ p
e
t); (1.4)
where ￿t is known as the gain parameter. Note that time-t prices are not entailed in the
learning rule: We assume that agents form their expectations at the beginning of period t,
where only t ￿ 1 prices are known.
Generally one can consider di⁄erent types of gain parameters. However, in the learning
literature two types are most prominent: A decreasing gain, s.t. ￿t = t￿1 and a constant gain,
￿t = ￿: The decreasing gain function is only practical if pt follows a stationary process, agents
start reasonably close to the rational expectations equilibrium and believe that the structure
of the economy never changes. Marcet and Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2000) show that under the assumption of a decreasing gain sequence, expectations derived
according to equation (1.4) converge to RE asymptotically (see annex D.).
By contrast, the constant gain learning with ￿t = ￿ for all t implies a model of continuous
learning. It involves a trade-o⁄ between bias and variance (or ￿tracking￿and ￿precision￿ )
when used in adapting to an exogenous time-varying process. In its recursive formulation
it places a greater weight on more recent observations. Compared to OLS estimation, the
algorithm is equivalent to estimating with weighted least squares where the weights decline
geometrically with the distance in time between the observation being weighted and the
most recent observation.9 It is also equivalent to the rolling-window regression of Friedman
(1979), where his rolling window of length ‘ is equivalent to a constant gain ￿ of 2=‘. The
advantage of the constant gain algorithm over rolling regressions and weighted least squares
9By contrast, in the decreasing gain algorithm with ￿t = 1=t all observations have equal weights as in
ordinary least squares procedures.
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is that the evolution of the former system is fully described by a small set of variables and
is thus both operationally tractable and in line with our behavioural assumption of bounded
rationality.
As we make use of the constant gain learning algorithm in our model, let us now see how
it applies to the simple one-country case above.10 Using the perceived law of motion (1.4),






















In order to derive the stability conditions, we need to linearize equation (1.5) around the
steady state. We employ a ￿rst order Taylor approximation around the steady state pt = p,
which leaves us with
p
e
t+1 = (1 + ￿(z













This implies that the steady state is stable under constant gain learning, i⁄
￿ ￿





￿ ￿ < 1; (1.7)







This condition, which is simple to derive in the scalar case, is known as the E-stability
condition, a key concept of the adaptive learning literature, which governs whether the
system converges under adaptive learning.




















In matrix notation we can now write the map from the perceived, represented by ￿0 =















10The analysis for the decreasing gain algorithm can be found in appendix D.
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Agents begin with an initial set of beliefs for the values of ￿ and revise those beliefs
through the learning process. The latter is modeled by means of the di⁄erential equation
d￿
d￿
= T (￿ (￿)) ￿ ￿ (￿); (1.9)
where ￿ is virtual time. Equation (1.9) represents a revision process in which the learning
rule ￿ is adapted towards the actual law of motion. This revision takes place at a ￿xed
rate per unit of virtual time ￿ and proportional to the discrepancy T (￿) ￿ ￿: Rational
expectations equilibria correspond to ￿xed points of T (￿):
De￿nition 1.1 (E-stability) Consider a ￿nitely parametrized family ￿ of possible models
of the endogenous data. De￿ne a map T : ￿ ! ￿ that indicates the pattern T (￿) that the
data will exhibit, if agents act on the basis of beliefs ￿ 2 ￿: The ￿xed points of the T-map
are the rational expectations equilibria. The equilibrium ￿￿ 2 ￿ is E-stable if it is a stable
rest point of the discrete-time dynamics ￿t+1 = T (￿t):
E-stability thus depends on the properties of the T-map from the PLM to the ALM
near the respective ￿xed points (i.e. the rational expectations equilibria). We say that
a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is locally learnable, or E-stable, if the REE is
locally asymptotically stable under equation (1.9), that is if and only if all eigenvalues of the
Jacobian have real parts less than one.
1.3 The Model
The benchmark economy we are considering throughout the paper is a version of the two-
country OLG model with ￿at money of Kareken and Wallace (1981) in which we explicitly
introduce adaptive learning features. We choose to analyze a version of the OLG model
because it is one of the simplest fully speci￿ed dynamic general equilibrium models in which
expectations matter.
There are two countries, A and B: At each date t, t ￿ 1, there is a constant population
of N young agents born in each country, said to be of generation t: They are young in period
t and old in period t + 1: Each agent of generation t is endowed with !1 units of a single
perishable consumption good in his ￿rst period and !2 of the good in the second period.
There is no production. In order to have a non-trivial decision problem, we assume that the
endowment in period 1 is su¢ ciently large compared to the endowment in period 2, that is
0 < !2 ￿ !1:11
11The way we specify endowments and preferences in our setup gives agents an incentive to save a pos-
itive amount of the period t endowments. Precautionary savings are encouraged by an isoelastic utility
speci￿cation.
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The world we are considering is one with free-trade and a ￿ exible exchange rate regime
without central bank intervention. Agents in both countries are permitted to borrow from
and lend freely to each other and to hold each other￿ s currency without any legal restrictions.
Agents in the two economies derive utility from consumption only. The consumption
good is identical in both countries. Agents consume ct of the good when young and ct+1
when old. We assume that consumption is a normal good in both periods. As there is no
production or storage technology and ￿at money is the only ￿nancial asset, agents can save
by acquiring currency 1 or currency 2 only. Moreover there is no bequest.
Agents in both countries are characterized by the separable utility function
u(ct;ct+1) = lnct + lnct+1: (1.10)
Moreover we assume that agents face cash-in-advance constraints, which will enable us
to get tractable money demand functions.
Fiat currency is introduced into this economy by a government that endures for ever.
The government in country i has control over a constant level of real de￿cit, which it ￿nances
entirely through seigniorage. Let real money supply in country i be given by
mi;t = ￿mi;t￿1Ri;t￿1; (1.11)
where ￿ > 1 is a constant money growth factor that cannot be observed by the agents.
Ri;t￿1 ￿ pi;t￿1=pi;t is de￿ned as the gross rate of return on currency i: We assume that all
government revenue leaves the economy and does not a⁄ect agents￿optimizing decisions.






Before analyzing the agents maximization problem, let us brie￿ y look at the sequencing
of actions within a period. An agent lives for two periods, t and t+1: In the ￿rst period he
decides on how much of his endowment to consume in the ￿rst period and how much to save
with a portfolio of two currencies. In the second period, the agent consumes his endowment
plus whatever is being saved in the ￿rst period. Consumption takes place at current market
prices which are determined in the money markets.
It is noteworthy that the update of the agent￿ s expectations takes place before the prices
of the current period are known. That is, while forming expectations pe
t+1, the current price
pt does not belong to the information set of the perceived law of motion.
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1.3.1 Households￿Maximization Problem
An agent of generation t has to solve the following maximization problem:
max
ct;M1;t
lnct + lnct+1; (1.13)


















where Mi;t is the agent￿ s nominal holding of currency i acquired at time t: p1;t is the
nominal price of the good in terms of currency 1 at time t; while p2;t is the nominal price
of the good in terms of currency 2 at time t. pe
i;t+1 denotes the time t expectation of the
respective price levels in period t + 1. Agents thus have to decide on how much to save
of their period t endowment and secondly, how to allocate these savings to currency 1 and
currency 2. To avoid corner solutions, an arbitrage-condition requires equal rates of return
on both assets, as otherwise one currency would be dominated and money holdings of that







For the solution of the individual household￿ s maximization problem it is convenient to






























From this we can derive the agent￿ s savings function,
st = !











12As there is no uncertainty in the model, an equilibrium condition (1.16) requires equal rates of return
for both currencies to be valued.
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Aggregate savings in country i are then given by
Si;t = Nst; 8 i = 1;2:












Given the money supply in country i at time t, Mi;t, the equilibrium for the money
























Without loss of generality we can set Re
t+1 = Re































Using de￿nition (1.12), we can derive the solution for the current exchange rate which
is a function of money supplies and the expected price levels in both countries.14
Due to Walras￿Law, the equilibria for the goods markets follow.
1.3.2 Perfect Foresight Solution





The individual agent￿ s savings function then becomes
st = !






















13Grandmont and Laroque (1991) refer to this as the temporary equilibrium relation.























Pi;t ; that follows from (1.19).
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Given money supply in country i at time t, Mi;t, the equilibrium for the money market














































Similarly we can derive the price level of country B.























From these price sequences we can derive the exchange rate solution via (1.12).
As the system (1.24) is rather complex to work with, let us rewrite the solutions for the
prices according to
p1;t = F (p1;t+1;p2;t+1;M1;t￿1;M2;t￿1)
p2;t = G(p1;t+1;p2;t+1;M1;t￿1;M2;t￿1): (1.25)
We can now de￿ne a perfect foresight equilibrium:
De￿nition 1.2 (Perfect Foresight Equilibrium) A perfect foresight equilibrium is a se-







and the sequence of prices satis￿es the equilibrium conditions (1.24).
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Steady state price processes are then given by
p1 = F (p1;p2;M1;M2)
p2 = G(p1;p2;M1;M2): (1.26)
The requirement for a monetary equilibrium in which both currencies are valued is that
the expected rate of return on currency 1, i.e. Re
1;t+1; and the expected rate of return on
currency 2, i.e. Re












t+1 = et = e t > 1. (1.28)
The rational expectations solution thus implies that the exchange rate is constant over
time.
Proposition 1.3 (Kareken and Wallace, 1981) Let e denote an exchange rate that sus-
tains a monetary equilibrium, where both currencies are valued. Then for any exchange rate
e 2 (0;1) there exists a monetary equilibrium.
Proof. See annex E.
This indeterminacy result stems from the fact that there is no legal restriction on money
holdings and only one equation for world money demand, namely equation (1.22). Therefore
individual real demands for each currency are not well de￿ned.
We consider these results as our benchmark case.
1.3.3 Adaptive Learning Solution






t + ￿t (pt￿1 ￿ p
e
t): (1.29)
The choice of the appropriate functional form for the gain sequence depends on the
properties of pt: A decreasing gain (s.t. ￿t = 1=t) would be appropriate if agents con￿dently
believe that they are in an economy in which the forecasted variable has no unit root. This
does not seem to be given empirically for the exchange rate.16 Thus, the proposed procedure
15As already mentioned in section 1.2. We assume that generations pass their information about the PLM
parameters to the next generation.
16See also section 1.2
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is a constant gain learning algorithm that is able to track changes in the level of pt more
easily.



























































We thus have a fully recursive system in the variables pe
i;t:
1.3.4 Local stability of the steady state under adaptive learning
Let us now analyze whether the system under adaptive learning converges, that is con-
ditions for the two price processes to be locally stable under adaptive learning. Applying















































These equations can be solved for pe





































To ensure that an equilibrium exists in which ￿at money is valued, we need one further
assumption:17 We require that ￿ 2 (0;￿);where ￿ is the maximum value for money growth,
17A monetary equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium with money being valued, exists if price levels are ￿nite.
In this case, since goods are perishable and money is the only store of value, money has a strictly positive
value.
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i.e. the amount of money collected by the government through seigniorage. Thus, the public
de￿cit cannot take on any value as ￿at money becomes not valued. We can show that ￿
is bounded by the inequality ￿








2!2 is the marginal
rate of substitution (see annex F.).
To analyze convergence of this system, one has to linearize the system (1.31) and ￿nd
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at the steady state. Only if all eigenvalues have
real parts less than one, local asymptotic stability is achieved.
For our model we can state the following result:
Proposition 1.4 (Convergence under adaptive learning) There exists ￿ > 0; s.t. ￿
￿ ￿












. Then e ￿ < ￿. If
￿ < e ￿, the dynamic system (1.31) is stable for all possible values of ￿ 2 (0;1): If e ￿ < ￿ < ￿,



















Proof. See annex G.
To illustrate the statement of this proposition, let us focus on ￿gure 3 which displays a
parameter space for which the equilibrium under learning exists and ￿at money is valued.
There are regions in which the equilibrium is locally stable, and parameter regions for which
the equilibrium is unstable.
For the ￿rst part of proposition 4, we basically have quali￿cations on ￿: ￿ < e ￿, gives
us convergence for any gain parameter in the assumed range. For ￿ > e ￿; however, stability
of the system under adaptive learning depends on the parameter values of both ￿ and ￿.
Notably a higher gain parameter (i.e. agents that learn faster, that are "more impatient")
and a higher money growth factor drive the system towards instability. Applying the implicit
function theorem one can show that @￿=@￿ < 0: For the parameter values employed in our
simulation analysis of section 4 the stability frontier, that is a well de￿ned border between
convergence and non-convergence regions, is given in ￿gure 3.
The results indicate that for a given ￿, a higher gain parameter implies that the local
stability criteria are not necessarily satis￿ed. Similarly, for a given value of the gain para-
meter, a higher level of money creation leaves the system locally unstable. This instability
results in an exchange rate that does not converge to its steady state value even in the limit
leaving us with perpetual learning dynamics. This supports our hypothesis, that learning
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behaviour can be regarded as an independent source of volatility in the foreign exchange
market. Agents are uncertain about the process determining the exchange rate. It is this
￿ model uncertainty￿that can partly explain the exchange rate volatility puzzle.
1.4 Simulations and Discussion of Results
Our theoretical analysis lets us conclude that learning can be an independent contribution
to exchange rate volatility. Under adaptive learning behaviour ￿ uctuations arise because
expectations are continually revised and these expectations feed back into actual exchange
rate processes. This allows for systematic forecast errors in succession. In this section we
try to quantify these e⁄ects by analyzing simulations of the model at hand. As canonical
monetary models with rational expectations fail to match the observed pattern of exchange
rate data, it is the persistence of exchange rate volatility is the primary scope of our analysis.
Given the use of a highly stylized model, simulations discussed in this section are meant
to be suggestive rather than an actual mirror image of real world exchange rate behaviour.
Nevertheless, from a heuristic point of view, the comparison of our results to actual DEM-
USD exchange rate data produces interesting insights in the analysis of common statistical
characteristics.
All simulations start with appropriate initial conditions that are in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of the steady state. We perturb the system under learning with a small one-time
shock. Throughout this section, we assume a constant population with N = 30 and initial
endowments and money supplies to be !1 = 200, !2 = 50, M1;0 = 100, and M2;0 = 110 re-
spectively.18 We run simulations for T = 500 periods and focus on four endogenous variables,
namely the nominal exchange rate, price expectations in country 1 and 2 and the average
utility of country 1. Respective steady state values are e = 0:94; p1 = 3; p2 = 3:2 and 2;897
for the average utility of country 1.
Though we also describe the behaviour of price expectations and average utility levels,
the most notable result of our analysis concerns the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate. Under rational expectations, the exchange rate is a constant in our model. Under
adaptive learning however, there exist parameter regions for which the exchange rate does
not converge.
Figure 4 exhibits a non-convergence case for which ￿ = 3 and ￿ = 0:5. We make use of a
high gain parameter, i.e. agents are pronouncedly impatient. Both expected prices and the
18Note that increasing endowment in period t relative to endowment in period t + 1 makes agents in our
model willing to save more. The quantitative aspects of learning on price and exchange rate behaviour thus
becomes more pronounced.
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exchange rate exhibit a relatively large volatility which is con￿ned within a certain band.
Moreover ￿gure 4 exhibits volatility clustering.
For ￿gure 5 we decrease the gain parameter to 0.1 and increase the money growth factor
to 7. It displays a markedly di⁄erent outcome; e⁄ects of volatility clustering are clearly
less pronounced, while the exchange rate shows larger swings. It seems that a smaller gain
parameter lets the exchange rate ￿ uctuate in a wider ￿band￿ , while a larger money growth
factor induces larger swings. To gain more insight, let us now focus on ￿gure 6 that shows
an example for the parametrization ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 7: We can see that the larger gain
parameter contributes in a particular way: While it decreases the amplitude of the swings in
the exchange rate, it increases the volatility around these swings, showing signs of volatility
clustering. This di⁄erence between ￿gures 5 and 6 highlights an important property of the
adaptive learning algorithm: the higher the gain parameter, the more pronounced is the
trade o⁄ between ￿tracking￿(￿ = 0:1) and ￿precision￿(￿ = 0:5).
We now turn to the discussion of the descriptive statistics of our simulated learning
equilibria. We focus again on the instability case. We make use of the stationary distribution
to derive results that are comparable to those of tables 1-3 which displays actual German
mark-U.S. dollar exchange rate data. Table 4 indicates that the volatility of the simulated
series is somewhere in between that of the weekly and the monthly German mark-U.S. dollar
data. The same resemblance holds once we look at the normality tests: While excess kurtosis
of the simulated exchange rate returns is close to the monthly German mark-U.S. dollar data,
skewness and chi^2 tests are closer to that of weekly data. Last but not least stationarity
tests indicate that the simulated series are non-stationary. From these results we can tell
that our simulated data face characteristics that are closest to weekly and monthly German
mark-U.S. dollar data.
However, having shown this similarity to actual German mark-U.S. dollar data, one
should also be concerned about the appropriateness of our adaptive learning assumption. A
useful criterion could be that forecast errors are su¢ ciently random (i.e. they can not be
detected too easily). We test that by analyzing the autocorrelation and partial autocorre-
lation functions of the simulated exchange rate forecast errors. We restrict our analysis to
a lag of 2 periods which covers the whole lifetime of our OLG agents. Figure 7 indicates
that although forecast errors do not vanish asymptotically, agents do not tend to produce
forecast errors that can be detected by standard econometric tests.19 While expectational
19Values within the upper and lower bound indicate that the autocorrelation of errors is not signi￿cant.-
Our results indicate that agents do make systematic forecast errors, which hints for at least some degree of
bounded rationality.
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errors are the driving force behind our results, we thus have an indication that learning and
adaptation are anything but irrational in our context. In this sense agents in our setup seem
to be "procedurally rational" while learning the true exchange rate process.
A more formal test of said results is the regression of the forecast error against the lagged
forecast error as in
e
e
t+1 ￿ et+1 = ￿ + ￿ (e
e
t ￿ et):
The result is given in table 7: We exhibit a small but signi￿cant amount of positive
serial correlation that indicates that adaptive expectations are mildly insu¢ cient and agents
should put even more weight on the current spot rate.
1.5 Conclusion
We considered a standard two-country OLG model similar to Kareken and Wallace (1981)
and highlighted the di⁄erence between rational expectations and adaptive learning solutions.
With rational expectations, the exchange rate process is constant. We can show that with
adaptive learning behaviour, local stability criteria are not satis￿ed for the entire parameter
space for which the monetary equilibrium exists. More precisely we get parameter regions in
which the adaptive learning solution is unstable, leaving the exchange rate to ￿ uctuate even
in the limit. This exchange rate volatility is entirely due to the learning assumptions made
in the paper.
We simulate our model to get a clearer idea of the quantitative relevance of our setup. As
it turns out, the model can generate time series which closely mimic statistical characteristics
of empirical weekly and monthly German mark- U.S. dollar data (1979-1998). Statistical
tests of the empirical distributions con￿rm this closeness.
The results provide support for the view that persistent volatility dynamics can be
generated even without introducing complex preference speci￿cations, nominal rigidities or
market imperfections, if the rational expectations assumption is relaxed. The introduction
of mildly boundedly rational beliefs may introduce a permanent e⁄ect of a one-time shock
such that the system does not settle down again asymptotically. We are thus able to give
an alternative interpretation of the large and persistent exchange rate volatilities beyond
conventional macroeconomic explanations.




LEANING AGAINST TOMORROW￿ S WIND - THE
EXPECTATIONAL CONTEXT OF DISINFLATION IN
TRANSITION
2.1 Introduction
The transformation from a socially planned to a market economy was accompanied by
rapidly increasing in￿ ation rates in many central and eastern European countries. The rea-
sons for that were manifold, such as swift measures of price liberalization, large monetary
overhangs, increased seigniorage to ￿nance public de￿cits that could not be ￿nanced other-
wise, and a lack of central bank independence and credibility.
Over several decades most prices in the centrally planned economies were set adminis-
tratively. Therefore, when the transition started there was very little economic experience to
rely upon and most economic agents, whether from the private or public sector, knew next to
nothing about basic macroeconomic mechanisms, including monetary policy. Even for cen-
tral and eastern European central banks, modelling in￿ ation is an inherently di¢ cult task
that is further complicated in transition economies due to the short time-span during which
free-market prices have existed. Furthermore, as a result of the major structural changes
that have been taken place over the last ￿fteen years, the relation between in￿ ation, money,
and other variables have been susceptible to instability. Central banks therefore possessed
only scant monetary policy instruments, and the private sector was not well enough informed
about changes in market conditions, at least at the time that these changes occurred, to be
able immediately to react in the way that would most fully serve their own interests. Not
surprisingly, many central and eastern European countries started out with massive in￿ a-
tion, in some cases close to or even above Cagan￿ s standard hyperin￿ ation threshold of 50
per cent per month.
However, while the run-up to hyperin￿ ationary kind of scenarios is relatively well un-
derstood, the miracle of escaping from these hyperin￿ ationary paths - that many central
and eastern European countries experienced in the 1990s - deserves further analysis. Tight
monetary and ￿scal policies, as favoured by leading economists and supported by IMF pro-
grammes, cannot be regarded as the full story of this success (see e.g. EBRD (1999)). King
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(1996) and Svensson (2003), besides others, give theoretical reasons why learning behaviour
in disin￿ ation processes could be important and show how disin￿ ation depends crucially on
whether the private sector immediately believes in a new in￿ ation regime or not. We try
to tackle these questions in the context of disin￿ ation processes in three eastern European
countries and try to show empirically, if private sector learning was important for success-
ful disin￿ ation. We introduce an empirical setup to tackle these questions by introducing
expectations derived from learning behaviour in an otherwise standard VAR.
While there is only one kind of full rationality, modelling learning behaviour can take
various expressions. We start from a relatively simple form of adaptive learning, which
has proven to match survey in￿ ation forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters
quite well. While the theoretical literature on private sector learning and in￿ ation has
gained a considerable momentum recently (Tetlow and Muehlen (1999), Bullard and Mitra
(2002), Orphanides and Williams (2003, 2004), Preston (2003), Molnar and Santoro (2005),
Gaspar et al. (2006) besides others), studies that empirically analyze the macroeconomic
implications of private sector learning are rare (see e.g. Timmermann (1993, 1996), Marcet
and Nicolini (2003)). This can be partly attributed to the fact that most of the models
employed are not able to address the issues of changing expectations because their dynamic
lag structure does not distinguish between sources of intrinsic and expectational dynamics.
This paper therefore considers an alternative approach for identifying the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks. It is our aim to provide a simple and tractable econometric model that enables
us to evaluate the potential for learning as a mechanism capable of improving the empirical
￿t compared to the canonical model. As any empirical learning model is confronted with
unobservable price expectations, we make use of Kalman ￿lter estimates of the perceived
in￿ ation rate. The Kalman ￿lter is an elegant way of deriving optimal model-based forecasts.1
The paper contributes to the literature on empirical adaptive learning models by applying
a method introduced by Hamilton (1985) to uncover unobservable price expectations and
using expectational variables in an otherwise standard VAR setup.
We examine the e⁄ects of monetary policy and private sector learning in three transition
countries (Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia) from the early 1990s until end 2000.2 Using
monthly data, we will show that private sector learning of the in￿ ation rate played a role in
the transition from high to low in￿ ation in the countries under consideration. Moreover, the
speed of disin￿ ation seems to depend on how strong the private sector￿ s learning behaviour
1Based on linear models and normal errors, the Kalman ￿lter is an optimal procedure that minimizes the
estimated error covariance. It is still an optimal linear predictor when errors are non-normal.
2We use di⁄erent sample periods for each country, thus taking into account that stabilization policies
started at di⁄erent dates.
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is. The "management" of private sector expectations thus becomes an important task of
monetary policy, making a strong call for instance for central bank transparency to facilitate
the learning process (see e.g. Blanchard (1998)).
A few caveats and quali￿cations should immediately be emphasized: First and foremost
we do not intend to model the whole process of transition from a centrally-planned to a
market economy. Most notably we disregard the initial liberalization phase (which gave
rise to hyperin￿ ation) and consider only the subsequent stabilization period starting around
1991/3. We acknowledge also that our analysis contributes only partly to the understanding
of the complex patterns of interaction of monetary policy and in￿ ation, as we are especially
interested in the importance of monetary policy and private sector learning. Moreover, our
analysis has a speci￿c reference to central and eastern European economies. While this term
applies to a highly heterogeneous array of institutional and economic realities, we deliberately
abstract from some considerations that would appear germane in setting monetary policy,
such as central bank independence, ￿scal constraints, and time-inconsistency problems.
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2.2 gives an overview of the related literature
and introduces the econometric methodology employed in the paper. We also discuss de-
scriptively the economic (stabilization) policie in the three countries under concern. Chapter
2.3 introduces the model. Estimates for monthly data for Poland, Lithuania, and Slovenia
are derived in chapter 2.4. We then analyze the impulse response functions generated by our
model, followed by concluding remarks in chapter 2.5.
2.2 Related Literature and Methodological Issues
While the long-run relationship between monetary variables and in￿ ation is relatively
well understood, a stable positive relationship between the price level and the nominal quan-
tity of money often fails once looking at high- or hyperin￿ ationary environments. On the
one hand, hyperin￿ ationary paths need not be generated by excessive seigniorage (Marcet
and Nicolini (2003), Woodford (2003)), but also disin￿ ation periods do not necessarily come
along with increasingly tight monetary and ￿scal policies.
According to Svensson (2003), "central banks control [...] in￿ ation mostly through the
private-sector expectations they give rise to." This implies that disin￿ ationary strategies by
the central bank involve changing prevailing expectations of private agents. While it is well
established among economists that expectations play a prominent role in economic deci-
sion making,3 the disagreement about the basis on which agents form expectations and thus
3Classic articles include Phelps (1967), Friedman (1968), Lucas (1972), Sargent (1973), Sargent and
Wallace (1975), Taylor (1975) and Barro (1976).
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about the way to model them is strong. This debate continues partly because obtaining data
on expectations is di¢ cult. Therefore, although in￿ ation expectations play an increasingly
important role in models of monetary policy, there has been little research done since the
seminal paper of Carlson and Parkin (1975) who showed that when in￿ ation is rapid, expec-
tations approximate roughly a second-order error-learning process. Figlewski and Wachtel
(1981) show that post-war in￿ ation expectations as collected by the Livingston Survey are in-
consistent with rational expectations and best described by an adaptive expectations model.
Pesaran (1985) analyzes the in￿ ation expectations of the British manufacturing industry
with the result that learning behaviour seems to be important in the expectations formation
process. Madsen (1996) analyzes producer￿ s in￿ ation expectations for several EC countries
and shows that rationality of expectations is likely not to be satis￿ed. Instead, an N-order
error-learning speci￿cations seem to ￿t the survey data much better. More recently, Caroll
(2003) and Branch (2004), using survey expectations of both households and professional
forecasters, show that deviations from rational expectations yield macroeconomic dynamics
that are more plausible for a variety of dimensions. Purely adaptive expectations perform
poorly too, while expectations derived from adaptive learning algorithms are very similar to
survey-based forecasts. Thomas (1999) summarizes the results for U.S. survey measures.
Although there is no indicator for a unique model of expectations formation, according
to Mankiw et al. (2003) survey data on in￿ ation expectations show substantial lack of
full rationality, thus pointing into the direction of a learning-based setup. A burgeoning
literature examining learning behaviour, both of central banks and the private sector, has
therefore started recently. On the theoretical side, learning behaviour of central banks has
been identi￿ed as one of the reasons for escaping from high in￿ ation regimes.4 On the other
hand, it has been shown that activist monetary policy in presence of learning is likely to
reduce the likelihood of a sustained in￿ ationary bias due to incorrect beliefs, but is prone to
induce nonstationary behaviour in economic observables which puts additional uncertainty
in private sector expectations that might o⁄set the bene￿ts of an activist policy.5
While there have been only few empirical contributions that look at private sector learn-
ing,6 it is noteworthy that even the most recent Federal Reserve macromodel ("FRB-World")
uses some form of non-fully-rational adaptive learning (see Brayton et al. (1997)). The un-
derlying justi￿cation for using learning behaviour is that although agents understand the
main features of the macroeconomy, their expectations are derived just from a small model
with time-unvarying parameters. One of the major results from this strand of literature is
4See Sargent (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), Gerali and Lippi (2002).
5See e.g. Wieland (2000), Ellison and Valla (2001), Schaling (2003), Lim and McNelis (2003).
6E.g. Bullard and Eusepi (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2003).
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that in dynamic economies with continuously learning agents, an activist disin￿ ation policy7
may cause in￿ ation expectations to "unmoor", which again might lead to in￿ ation persis-
tence that would otherwise not be given. The "management" of private sector in￿ ation
expectations therefore becomes a crucial part of any stabilization policy.
2.2.1 Disin￿ ation in Central and Eastern Europe
Over several decades, most prices in the centrally planned economies of central and
eastern Europe (CEE) were set administratively, with little regard towards costs or supply
and demand. Prices on the whole were subject to strict controls and measured in￿ ation was
most of the time low or at least repressed. Already in 1989, most CEE countries liberalized
a large proportion of producer and consumer prices, leading into lasting, volatile, high and
open in￿ ation. The peak of average in￿ ation among the 15 transition countries was in
1990/2, although one has to note that in￿ ationary processes varied considerably throughout
the region (see table 8 for a selection of countries).
The literature on the determinants of in￿ ation has traditionally identi￿ed various demand-
pull and cost-push factors that have successfully explained the temporal behaviour of in￿ a-
tionary processes. Classic demand-pull factors are money and credit growth as well as the
monetization of ￿scal de￿cits. Cost-push factors have centered on wage growth in excess
of productivity gains. Concerning the CEE countries, all factors seem to be more or less
relevant, at least part of the time. Conducting monetary policy in such circumstances was a
di¢ cult (many observers said futile) task. Moreover, there was a control problem for mone-
tary policy: Available time series were often short, highly non-stationary and even unreliable.
Furthermore, ongoing structural adjustment in the real sectors of the economy or changes
in the ￿nancial sector often seriously interfered with any credible attempt to bring down
in￿ ation considerably. Needless to say that there were no o¢ cial nor reliable measures for
in￿ ation expectations.
However, despite all these di¢ culties, the median in￿ ation rate in CEE was brought
down from nearly 100% in 1992 to approximately 11% in 1997. Many economists believed
that this impressive record of disin￿ ation was mainly due to strict monetary policy and ￿scal
restraints.8 However, by using an eyeball-inspection of the data on our three countries under
consideration (see ￿gures 8-10 for illustration), this argument is not as clear cut as it seems.
So why did the transition countries do so well in bringing in￿ ation under control? Certainly,
7For instance a more than one-for-one response in the monetary policy instrument due to changing
in￿ ation.
8The latter argument being based on Sargent￿ s (1982) argument that in hyperin￿ ationary environments
in￿ ation only comes to a halt when the government credibly changes ￿scal policy.
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the interplay of monetary, ￿scal and exchange rate policies did have an important impact in
the initial stabilization phase. Given the wide variety of potential sources for in￿ ation, any
e⁄ective disin￿ ation strategy has to rely on a broad set of measures from di⁄erent policy
￿elds. However, empirical studies were only partially successful in explaining the disin￿ ation
process by macroeconomic policies (see e.g. Elbourne and de Haan (2005) for a recent
study). Thus, while the initial disin￿ ation was a remarkable achievement, the explanation
for sound macroeconomic stability were weak in many countries. It is therefore not surprising
that since the beginning of the post-communist transition period, an enormous amount of
research on in￿ ation and disin￿ ation in transition has been published.9
Recent studies (e.g. Lyziak (2001) or Dabrowsky (2003)) indicate that anchoring in￿ a-
tionary expectations can be regarded as one of the pillars of a successful disin￿ ation policy
by breaking down accumulated in￿ ationary inertia. This view is highlighted for instance
by the monetary policy council of the National Bank of Poland, stating that the monetary
regime needs to break through "in￿ ationary expectations, which constitute one of the main
obstacles in the process of steadily reducing in￿ ation" (NBP (1998)). While private sec-
tor expectations are important, most empirical contributions assume that the private sector
catches on immediately to a new policy. The low interest in in￿ ation expectations in transi-
tion economies can perhaps be explained by the lack of experience with open in￿ ation in the
majority of these economies, the lack of survey data on expectations of in￿ ation and initially
the unavailability of reliable time series.
Following the pioneering work by Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
agents￿forecasting rules ("perceived laws of motion") are often speci￿ed as some (in￿nite
memory) ordinary least-square estimate. In the presence of potential structural changes,
however, a learning speci￿cation with ￿nite memory is more appropriate. The bene￿t from
such a characterization is that learning remains tractable and particularly alert to shifts in
the underlying economic structure, which is appropriate in the transition perspective relevant
to our model.
We assume that agents, when forming their expectations about period t + 1, have ac-






t + ￿(￿t ￿ ￿
e
t); (2.1)
where ￿ is called the gain parameter, ￿t is the period t in￿ ation rate, and ￿e
t is the expected
in￿ ation rate of period t where expectations are derived in period t￿1.10 From this charac-
9For comprehensive reviews of the ￿rst decade of transition see e.g. Cottarelli and Doyle (1999), EBRD
(1999), and Wyplosz (2000).
10Note that the gain parameter is not an arbitrary learning parameter, but rather a speci￿c value deter-
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terization it becomes clear that agents￿behaviour shows bounded rationality features: While
agents use equation (2.1) to update their expectations, they do not take into account their
subsequent updating behaviour in periods T > t: Agents thus take their beliefs (and also the
model) as a constant, even though they evolve recursively.
One can show easily that the updating formula (2.1) gives a higher weight to more recent
observations. This "fading memory" has a convenient Bayesian interpretation: If there had
never been a regime change in the past, agents would optimally put equal weight on all past
observations. By contrast, if there has been a history of occasional regime shifts or if agents
believe that such a regime shift might occur in the future, discounting past observations
mirrors exactly these beliefs. The constant gain ￿ implies that agents somehow overreact to
a measure of their past forecast error. This will be of utmost importance for our analysis as
it allows for the possibility that agents learn a new policy more quickly, which is the channel
through which learning behaviour has an impact in our empirical analysis.
2.2.2 Economic Policies in Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania
2.2.2.1 Poland
Poland became known for its comprehensive and speedy reforms (so-called "big-bang"
reform, or "shock-therapy") which started with the Balcerowicz Plan released on October 12,
1989. Interest rates increased sharply, prices were liberalized on a large scale, ￿scal policy was
restrained, the exchange rate sharply devalued and wage control was introduced. Just after
his inauguration, Polish ￿nance minister Balcerowicz stated that "[w]e see monetary and
price stabilization as an immediate task and a precondition for structural adjustment". It
was thus diagnosed that microeconomic liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization were
mutually conditional, but macroeconomic stability was key for a successful reform.11 With
Poland￿ s IMF supported programme the economy started to undergo a massive restructuring
on its adjustment path to the postcommunist era. This laid the ground for an enormous
expansion of private business activity which cushioned the otherwise collapsing industrial and
agricultural activity, both in terms of absolute GDP and in terms of employment. However,
these structural changes in the economy did not occur without initial sacri￿ce: GDP declined
sharply in 1989-91 by approximately 17% p.a., but then experienced a lasting U-turn in 1992
with positive growth rates ever since.
Besides the o¢ cial goal to bring down in￿ ation quickly, the National Bank of Poland
mined by the behaviour of the process in question.
11Note that this kind of reform is still not without criticism. Many economists plead instead for a more
gradual kind of reform, which is supposed to put less burden on economic agents.
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(NBP) faced considerable di¢ culties in conducting monetary policy in the early stabilization
period. In fact there was not even a consensus, whether monetary policy mechanisms were
an important factor at all for bringing down in￿ ation. It is therefore not surprising that
Polish monetary policy in the 1990s is a patchwork of continuous revisions of strategies
and targets. While the initial ￿xed exchange-rate regime (against the US-$) was an anti-
in￿ ationary anchor in the beginning of economic transition in 1990, it was abandoned already
in 1991 after several one-o⁄devaluations and converted into a crawling-peg regime. Already
at that time other channels of monetary policy gained importance (see e.g. Golinelli and
Rovelli (2002)): Open market operations and from 1993 onwards a shift towards reserve and
money market rates became the dominant monetary policy tool, while the exchange rate
band was subsequently widened and abolished. In 1995 the currency was reformed with the
new zloty worth 10,000 times the old unit.
The increasingly ￿ exible exchange rate regime was introduced to pre-empt currency
crises and to introduce in￿ ation targeting via managing the domestic interest rate (in 1998).
However, the o¢ cial in￿ ation target was overshot for the ￿rst three years and undershot in
2001-2003.
Already since 1994, the NBP experienced a considerable independence, which was for-
malized in the 1997 constitutional act. While the NBP is supposed to control exchange and
interest rates, the ￿nance ministry has responsibility for the state budget which implies an
inherent political con￿ ict. Moreover, the central bank law de￿nes price stability as the ulti-
mate goal of monetary policy, but also explicitly allows for a secondary objective, which is
loosely de￿ned by providing support for the overall economic policies. Besides this apparent
policy mix, the NBP spares no e⁄ort in improving its credibility and transparency. Not only
does the NBP publish monthly monetary aggregates, but also statements by the monetary
policy committee are released timely on its website.
2.2.2.2 Slovenia
Slovenia has adopted a gradualist approach to economic reform, maintaining that the
country￿ s advanced level of economic development made certain types of reform unnecessary
which were pursued in other CEE countries. Slovenia was also the only accession country
which never adopted an IMF programme, which gave considerable leeway to government
and central bank policies. In fact this resulted in a number of unorthodox policy measures.
Prices were only liberalized partly,12 and capital controls were used extensively in the 1990s
to discourage portfolio investment. These controls were abolished only in 2001, and the
12In 2003 still 16% of all prices were administered.
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capital account was not liberalized before 2002. But also in the real sector restructuring
was particularly slow, especially in the enterprise sector. As Arvai and Vincze (2002) note,
"Slovenia is a case of avoiding all sorts of crises at the cost of maintaining relatively strong
capital controls, and pursuing extremely cautious macroeconomic policies".
Immediately after its formal independence in late 1991, Slovenia has made remarkable
progress in reducing in￿ ation through a money-based stabilization programme. While initial
liberalization lead to hyperin￿ ationary kind of behaviour, the annual in￿ ation rate fell below
100% already in 1992. Monetary policy, for which the Bank of Slovenia (BS) is primarily
responsible, set the rediscount rate at 25% in 1992, and introduced base money as its chief
operating target. Moreover, M3 was set as an intermediate target for monetary policy, as
well as an active exchange rate policy within a managed ￿ oat regime. The latter is owed to
the fact that the central bank law explicitly spells out the importance of national currency
stability. O¢ cially, however, Slovenia did not make any exchange rate announcement.
The government was keeping its spending broadly within the limits of revenue and small
budget de￿cits started only in the late 1990s. Serious budget de￿cits were however never an
issue of concern, which is also contributed to the fact that Slovenia started with a relatively
low level of outstanding public debt when it separated from rest-Yugoslavia.
While bringing down in￿ ation to moderate levels was successful and materialized quickly,
Slovenia exhibited a stubbornly persistent in￿ ation with high single-digit rates since the mid
1990s. Therefore, on it￿ s way towards EU-membership, the BS increased interest rates by
300 basis points in early 2001 and declared a formal in￿ ation target in 2002 in line with the
Maastricht criterion. However, this target was missed by a signi￿cant margin in subsequent
years and met only very recently. Main reason for the strong persistence in in￿ ation was seen
in the ine⁄ective coordination of ￿scal and monetary policies together with the mentioned
protracted reforms of the real and ￿nancial sectors.
2.2.2.3 Lithuania
Shortly after its independence in 1990, Lithuania experienced a sharp decline in its GDP
(7% in 1990, 14% in 1991 and 38% in 1992). The highly industrialized country was hit
particularly by the rise of energy prices to world market levels on the one hand and a large
drop of demand for agricultural products of its eastern neighbours. Despite these unfavor-
able preconditions, the government embarked on rapid, market-oriented reforms. Prices were
liberalized comprehensively by 1993 which resulted in sharp increases of CPI rates to hyper-
in￿ ationary levels. The government subsequently introduced a law to compensate depositors
whose savings were destroyed by the hyperin￿ ation, which led to severe budget de￿cits that
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got more or less out of control by end 1993. The IMF-supported programme introduced in
1994 therefore targeted notably at macroeconomic stabilization. But it took until the end of
the 1990s until a sound austerity programme was started by the government which reduced
the public de￿cit towards the level of the Maastricht criterion.
Monetary policy in Lithuania is characterized by its imposition of a currency board
system in 1994. Initially the litas was pegged to the US-$, due to the importance of energy
imports. This peg was changed in 2002, when the litas was set in reference to the Euro.
In general, in a currency board the monetary authority will no longer issue ￿at money but
instead will only issue a set number of units of the local currency for each unit of foreign
currency it possesses. However, Lithuania did not opt for such a "pure" currency board
which resulted in a more active role for the Bank of Lithuania (BoL) and less stringent
requirements in terms of budgetary discipline for the government. Moreover, as in Poland,
the central bank law entails a reference to a secondary objective of central bank policy next
to the primary goal of price stability. This policy mismatch resulted in considerable foreign-
exchange out￿ ows which automatically resulted in a contraction of the monetary base and
higher interest rates and domestic credit squeeze. Nevertheless in￿ ation was kept under
control after 1995 with the help of the currency board arrangement and favourite external
factors such as a drop in oil prices and a collapse of the Russian export markets after the
crisis in 1998.
2.2.3 VARs and Adaptive Learning
Sims￿(1980) seminal paper on vector autoregressions (VAR) prepared the ground for
replacing the 1970s approach of simultaneous equations modelling, advocated by the Cowles
Commission and until then the dominating paradigm in econometrics.13 However, VARs
have the status of a reduced-form and are thus merely vehicles to summarize the dynamic
properties of the data.14 Without reference to a speci￿c economic structure such reduced-
form VARs are di¢ cult to understand (see e.g. Bernanke (1986), Cooley and LeRoy (1985)).
As long as the parameters of a VAR are not related to structural ones, they do not have an
economic meaning and are subject to the Lucas critique.15 According to Sims (2000), the
original meaning of a structural model in econometrics is explained in an article by Hurwicz
(1962): A model is structural if it allows us to predict the e⁄ect of interventions. In order to
13The Cowles Commission approach tries to evaluate the e⁄ects of changes in exogenous variables on the
endogenous variables of a system.
14One has to admit, however, that the basic reason for introducing VARs was economic forecasting rather
than macroeconometric policy analysis.
15Lucas (1976) argues that the parameters of a macroeconomic models depend on agents￿expectations of
the policy conduct and are unlikely to remain stable as economic policy changes.
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be able to make these predictions, the model must tell us how the intervention corresponds
to changes in some of the variables or parameters of the model. Coming from this point,
VAR models have become a major tool in analyzing macroeconometric time series, notably
in monetary economics. In a VAR, a group of economic variables is interpreted as being
driven exclusively by unobservable economic shocks. In order to recover these shocks from
the data, one has to estimate a VAR by maximum likelihood estimation and decompose the
residuals into economically meaningful structural shocks. Let us look brie￿ y at a simple
example which substantiates our introduction.
A VAR model is the generalization of a univariate autoregression, i.e.
A(L)xt = "t; (2.2)
where A(L) denotes a lag polynomial of order p. For "t being normally distributed
("t ￿ iid(0;￿")), one can estimate matrix A with least-squares which is in this case equivalent
with maximum-likelihood estimation. Note that all right-hand variables can interact with
xt. A priori it is only the shocks which are exogenous, all other in￿ uences are endogenous.
Note that in the Cowles Commission approach, constraints on the matrix A would be used
to identify the system (see e.g. Favero (2001) for a discussion). In contrast, the VAR
approach restricts the covariance matrix ￿"; that is the in￿ uence of the structural shocks on
the variables.
In a VAR, vector "t is regarded as a vector of independent structural disturbances.
To recover them econometrically, one has to transform the structural model (2.2) into an
estimable reduced-form, i.e.
xt = B (L)xt + ut; (2.3)
where u ￿ N (0;￿u):16 Note that the reduced-form errors ut are linear combinations of
the structural errors "t, where
E [utu
0





Interpretation of the reduced-form is di¢ cult because matrix B involves many parame-
ters. Without some restrictions, the parameters in the VAR would not be identi￿ed. That is,
given the values of the reduced-form parameters, it would not be possible to uniquely solve for
the structural parameters. Whereas Sims (1980) has argued that economic theory is not rich
enough to suggest proper identifying restrictions, Bernanke (1986), Sims (1986), and others
16Note that this transformation hinges on the assumption that the inverse of A(L) exists, meaning that
A has full rank.
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have argued forcefully that VAR analysis without identi￿cation of independent shocks will
leave the researcher without meaningful theoretical implications. However, although VARs
have become a popular tool for evaluating economic models, especially in monetary policy
issues, the debate about what constitutes appropriate identifying restrictions is still vivid.
The only apparent consensus is that structural shocks should be mutually uncorrelated ("or-
thogonal"), which implies that we can analyze the impact of just one structural shock on
the VAR system. However, the assumption of orthogonal shocks is mostly not su¢ cient for
an exact identi￿cation. In particular, for an n-dimensional system, a total of n(n ￿ 1)=2
additional restrictions are needed.17 Thus, there remains to be a wide range of possible iden-
tifying restrictions which come along with the same reduced-form representation. Typical
identifying restrictions are zero restrictions and linear restrictions on the elements of B:
Note that we only tackle identifying assumptions on the contemporaneous movements
of the variables and do not perform an explicit long-run analysis for the countries under
concern.18
In the applied VAR literature economists implemented model speci￿cations that induced
"reasonable" behaviour. Such reasonableness is usually evaluated by means of an impulse
response analysis. Structural impulse responses are plots of the structural dynamic multipli-
ers of an identi￿ed system and thus summarize how unit impulses of a particular structural
shock at time t a⁄ects the level of the economic variables of interest at time t + s: In order
to ￿nd these impulse responses, the VAR needs to be transformed in its moving average





where the elements of the matrices C￿ give the impulse responses of xt to changes in "t.
In many cases, identi￿cation of the parameters in the VAR is given via restricting parameters
in the Wold representation. Any such restriction is equivalent to restrictions in the VAR
representation.
Note that even VARs are susceptible to the Lucas critique, that is policy changes are
in some cases not appropriately re￿ ected in changes of private sector forecasting. However,
empirical macroeconomic models for monetary policy analysis usually abstract from mod-
17That is a total number of n2 restrictions are needed for a n￿ dimensional system.
18For the monetary transmission process considered in our paper, long-run behaviour is per se not perti-
nent. Moreover, long-run restrictions as proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) have been criticized e.g. by
Faust and Leeper (1997) for statistical reasons. Moreover, informal short-run restrictions remain necessary
to identify the structural shocks completely.
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elling expectations explicitly,19 although expectational e⁄ects, caused by policy changes, are
likely to feed back in the reduced-form dynamics of the model. But how could one possibly
tackle expectations in a VAR approach? Several ways of proceeding in that respect were
considered, such as introducing available Greenbook expectations for U.S. data (e.g. Barth
and Ramey (2000), introducing control variables such as the federal funds futures rate (e.g.
Brissimis and Magginas (2006) or commodity prices (e.g. Sims (1992)). Another alterna-
tive is the so-called "expectations theory" of the interest rate term structure (e.g. Fung
et al. (1999)). However, all approaches had it￿ s limitations and are moreover not directly
applicable to accession countries.
In our model, we therefore proceed di⁄erently. By introducing expectations exogenously
as the outcome of an unobservable learning process and using the Kalman ￿lter method of
Hamilton (1985), we are able to reveal optimal model-based private sector in￿ ation expec-
tations which are subsequently introduced into our VAR analysis.
2.3 Model Setup
Already Friedman (1979) argued that the assumption of rational expectations in this
context may be unrealistic, especially in periods which follow a major policy change because
agents have not had su¢ cient time to fully comprehend the implications of the new policy.
In our view this directly applies to the experience in CEE and we therefore explicitly model
private sector expectations by assuming learning about the conduct of the monetary policy
by means of the in￿ ation rate.20 As it is common, we compare this result to a case where
learning behaviour is not present.
We consider a small-open economy case similar to Peersman and Smets (2001), where
we can write the VAR as
Yt = A(L)Yt￿1 + B (L)Xt + ￿t; (2.5)
where Yt is a (5x1) vector of endogenous variables, namely xt as output, pt as CPI, mt
as money, st as the short￿ term interest rate and ft as the real e⁄ective exchange rate. ￿t is
a (5x1) vector of reduced-form shocks, A(L) and B (L) are lag polynomials and Xt a (3x1)
vector of exogenous variables. The inclusion of exogenous variables can be justi￿ed as we
19Exceptions are the publications by Brunner (1996) and Rudebusch (2005).
20Note that abstracting from deeper accounts here can be justi￿ed by the poor standards of o¢ cial statistics
in CEE, the lag in providing adequate data and the general obscurity of the monetary transmission mechanism
in these countries. The burgeoning literature on DSGE-VARs (see e.g. Caputo (2003), Del Negro et al.
(2006), Smets and Wouters (2004)) can be seen as a useful workhorse in applying learning behaviour which
stems from deeper accounts. According to Del Negro et al. (2006), a "VAR can be interpreted as an
approximation to the moving-average representation of the DSGE model." However, in the analysis of CEE
countries, this approach seems to be less useful, as the use of log-linearized approximations of steady-state
relationships is likely to produce implausible results for accession countries.
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model small-open CEE economies which are likely to be a⁄ected from shocks abroad but
the (big) foreign country is not a⁄ected by the small-open economy. In our ￿rst setup we
consider three types of possible exogenous factors, namely change in EU countries￿demand









t is the average GDP of EU
countries, cpEU
t denotes the EU￿ s average commodity price index, and sEU
t is the average
short-term interest rate. The inclusion of cpEU
t instead of average EU-CPI can be justi￿ed
because of the so-called price puzzle.21
All data used are monthly, seasonally adjusted series in levels, measured in natural logs
(except for the interest rate) and taken from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database, EBRD transition reports as well as data from the European Central Bank.
Output is measured in terms of real GDP which is not available at a monthly frequency.
Instead of using a proxy for output such as measures of industrial production,22 we make
of use of interpolated quarterly GDP series constructed along the lines of Bernanke et al.
(1997). Money is measured by M1 unless otherwise noted. The short-term interest rate is
the discount or money market rate, depending on the availability. ft is the real e⁄ective
exchange rate. Note that - according to standard ADF tests - most variables in our model
are integrated of order one. However, Sims et al. (1990), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) and Kim and Roubini (2000) suggest to estimate the VAR in levels instead of ￿rst
di⁄erences in this case which allows for implicit cointegrating relationships asymptotically.23
This is particularly useful when using monthly series, as the power of the cointegration tests
are likely to be low. Moreover, the considered data samples are not long enough to perform
more detailed long-run analyses.
A key component in any monetary VAR is the de￿nition of the monetary policy reaction
function. We follow the literature by using the interest rate as the main policy tool, which
is a prominent and widely used monetary policy tool in CEE countries. We do that by
modelling one of the VAR equations as a variant of Taylor rule, which is an interest rate rule
that responds to output and in￿ ation. As McCallum (1999) argues, a policy reaction function
should not include current variables such as current prices as those are only observable with
a lag. This feature was also highlighted by Sims and Zha (1998) and Kim and Roubini (2000)
and will be used in our identi￿cation procedure as well be seen below.
21Originally documented by Sims (1992), a positive shock to the federal funds rate (short-term interest
rate) often leads to persistent increases in consumer prices, the so-called "price-puzzle". Solutions were
proposed inter alia by Sims and Zha (1998) by including a commodity price index. The reason behind this
is that it is assumed that the central bank has information about future in￿ ation beyond the data available
in the endogenous variables of the VAR, which are capture by the commodity price.
22Note that this proxy would have just been given for two of our three countries anyway.
23See also Hamilton (1994, ch. 18) on this issue.
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2.3.1 Identi￿cation Issues
A crucial feature of VAR models is the imposition of identifying restrictions on the
dynamic behaviour of structural shocks. As mentioned before, identi￿cation is key if we
want to arrive at interpretable results for the structural shocks. We begin with recognizing
that the reduced-form VAR (2.5) can be represented in a structural form according to
A0Yt = A(L)Yt￿1 + B (L)Xt + "t; (2.6)
where "t ￿ (0;￿"): Note that representations (2.5) and (2.6) are related to each other
via the following rules:





0 = ￿￿: (2.7)
The structural identi￿cation usually begins with restrictions on the variance covariance
matrix ￿" by making it diagonal and normalizing the elements to one. Economically this
guarantees that the structural errors are mutually uncorrelated. However, this leaves us
with n(n ￿ 1)=2 additional restrictions needed for an exact identi￿cation of the VAR. One
of way of achieving this, is a recursive identi￿cation scheme, usually referred to as the
Choleski decomposition. By this we isolate the underlying structural errors by recursive
orthogonalization. The key assumption in any Choleski decomposition is related to the
order in which the variables are stacked in the vector of endogenous variables Yt. The
ordering of the variables in Yt determines the level of exogeneity of the variables. A widely






xt pt mt st ft
i
: (2.8)
This ordering assumes that policy shocks have no contemporaneous e⁄ect on output,
prices or money.24 Note that if the exchange rate is ordered last in the VAR, as in equation
(2.8), this basically means that neither the home nor the foreign country reacts contempora-
neously to exchange rate ￿ uctuations. That means that the exchange rate is not part of the
central bank￿ s information set when the level for policy variable is being chosen. Note that
the Choleski decomposition imposes a just-identifying scheme and is uniquely determined
24See McCallum (1999). Note also that this de￿nition entails a time series perspective: If one variable is
causal for another, it has to be realized before.
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up to an orthogonal transformation. This implies that each structural shock is identi￿ed up
to its sign. Our VAR would then be
2
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+ B (L)Xt + ￿t: (2.9)
However, in a small open economy setup this identi￿cation scheme is not appealing, as
small open economies are particularly concerned about exchange rate shocks and it is not
plausible that the monetary policy rule does not interact with the exchange rate. This was the
major concern of Kim and Roubini (2000) which let them derive an alternative identi￿cation
scheme for the study of small-open economies. We consider the following (modi￿ed) version
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Note that in our 5-dimensional VAR, the imposition of 10 additional restrictions as above
leads to a just-identi￿ed system. Moreover, the interpretation of (2.10) is handy: Following
Sims and Zha (1998), it is assumed that monetary policy does not respond contemporane-
ously to output or prices, an assumption of information delay which seems plausible when
using CEE data. Even more this assumption seems appropriate as we use monthly data. Be-
sides this, money, the short-term interest rate (as the policy tool) and the exchange rate are
allowed to interact contemporaneously and are just mildly restricted.25 This is an important
feature of our setup, as monetary policy in many CEE countries has been a hybrid construct
of interest rate rules combined with elements of money supply and exchange rate policies.
Restricting these interactions contemporaneously with zero restrictions would therefore likely
to be ￿ awed.
25As Peersman and Smets (2001) argue, the exchange rate is supposed to react like an asset price and is
therefore contemporaneously in￿ uenced.
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115732.3. MODEL SETUP 39
The money demand equation is fairly standard and depends on income and the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money. Moreover, we have a Phillips-curve relationship, where the
change in in￿ ation depends positively on lagged output.
2.3.1.1 The Fixed-Exchange Rate Model for Lithuania
For the case of Lithuania, which has a currency board arrangement, a ￿xed exchange
rate without ￿ uctuations is given. This means that the exchange rate is not an endogenously
determined variable in Yt but exogenous to the model. For our data sample under consid-
eration, the litas was pegged to the U.S. dollar from April 1994 onwards. Note that the
monetary policy authority loses its policy tool in a ￿xed exchange rate system as its primary
goal is to keep the parity to the foreign exchange rate anchor. Similar to the spring 2004
report of the European Forecasting Network (EFN (2004)), we assume that the exchange
rate becomes an exogenous variable, while the foreign short-term interest rate is included as
the most exogenous variable in Yt. However, instead of using the average EU interest rate,
we take the U.S. Federal Funds Rate, sFF
t , as the Lithuanian Litas was pegged to the US-$
until 2002. 2







































5 + ￿t: (2.11)
We make use of a Choleski identi￿cation scheme as in EFN (2004), which is sensible as
it endogenizes domestic interest rates and leaves the foreign interest rate as a completely
exogenous variable which a⁄ects all other endogenous variables within the system.
2.3.2 Including Expectations in VAR Models
Sometimes endogenous variables are presumed to depend not only on endogenous and
exogenous variables as in equation (2.5), but additionally on expectations about endogenous
variables. A standard VAR model is based on the information summarized in the contempo-
raneous and lagged values of the endogenous variables and does not permit the inclusion of
any learning-based forward-looking expectations. When considering expectations, assuming
rational expectations is still the standard workhorse. However, for CEE this assumption
seems to be too strong and there are certain indicators that learning behaviour mattered
(see e.g. Lyziak (2003)). We therefore make use of adaptive learning according to (2.1),
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which is the so-called statistical approach to learning. We do that by applying the Kalman
￿lter to derive in￿ ation forecasts from lagged in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations. This is
a variant of a time-varying recursive least squares learning algorithm, which produces the
"best" estimates of in￿ ation expectations.26 These learning-based expectations data are then
used in our VAR analysis.
Let us now have a closed look at the way the in￿ ation expectations are generated.
According to standard ADF tests, in￿ ation rates in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia are best
described as a variable which is integrated of order one.27 In other words, in￿ ation can be
described as a random walk process,
￿t = ￿t + vt; (2.12)
where vt is iid with zero mean. As Ljung and S￿derstr￿m (1983) show, equation (2.12)
can be seen as a special case of the general state-space representation
￿t = ￿t + vt
￿t = ￿t￿1 + wt; (2.13)
where ￿t is the state variable. We consider var(vt) = ￿2
v; and var(wt) = ￿2
wI for technical
reasons. Denote b ￿t+1 as the estimator of the state ￿t+1. We can then write the Kalman ￿lter
(see e.g. Harvey (1989)) as
b ￿t+1 = b ￿t + ￿t (￿t ￿ b ￿t); (2.14)







where Pt is the mean square error of the estimator b ￿t, which can be represented as
Pt = Pt￿1 ￿ ￿tPt￿1 + var(wt): (2.16)
We are then able to use the Kalman ￿lter for a one-step ahead prediction of the in￿ ation
rate. Note that this is a learning model which shows a considerable rationality on the side of
the private sector, as it produces optimal forecasts in an unstable economic environment. It
is a useful concept for our transition countries, however, as it entails implicitly a time-varying
framework which is able to capture changes in the in￿ ation process.28
26"Best" here means that the Kalman ￿lter is the best linear forecast of the unobserved variable based on
available information. However, in the relatively small samples under consideration, the Kalman ￿lter might
not be optimal and there might exist non-linear ￿lters which would do better.
27To save space, ADF tests are not reported here but available on request.
28To implement the Kalman ￿lter, one has to specify the starting values for P0 and ￿0: We make use of
educated guesses, which is the best we can do given that we have a random walk process.
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We have seen how we derive our in￿ ation expectations from real world data recursively.
In the next step we can advance on our initial VAR setup (2.9) and include in￿ ation expec-












































Our new model tries to improve on standard VAR setups by including additional in￿ a-
tion expectations as an exogenous variable. This adds some additional informational content
to the VAR but does not condition the expectations on other endogenous variables of the
VAR. Assuming this kind of exogeneity for in￿ ation expectations implies also that they are
independent of the residual process (see also Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983)). Let me
brie￿ y explain, why this assumption seems to be reasonable: Firstly, data availability of
monetary policy aggregates was generally poor in CEE, at least in the early stabilization
phase. Moreover, macroeconomic variables such as output were available only with consid-
erable lags which made them less useful for expectations formation. On the other hand, the
monetary authorities had only scant ideas about the expectations formation process of the
private sector, due to a general lack of understanding of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism and also because surveys such as the ones conducted in industrialized countries
were not known. From this perspective it seems to be reasonable to assume that expectations
were exogenous to the rest of the VAR variables.29
2.4 Results of the Identi￿ed VAR
Before presenting the VAR results, let us brie￿ y note some important prerequisites for
our analysis. The ￿rst one concerns the di⁄ering sample periods under consideration. As
noted before, we do not intend to model the whole process of economic liberalization and
stabilization in transition countries, but try to focus on the stabilization period only. As
economic reform did not start at the same time in all countries, we use Polish data from
01/1991, Lithuanian data from 01/1993 and Slovenian data from 01/1992. We only consider
data until 12/2000, as afterwards the European Commission￿ s DG ECFIN started to publish
consumer surveys for price trends, which would have a considerable impact on our model.
29We also checked our assumption technically. Huh (2003) has shown that a variables is weakly exogenous
to the structural model if there is no Granger causality from the variable of interest to the other variables
in the reduced form. We therefore perform a Granger causality test which con￿rms our assumption.
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For the time period under consideration, potential parameter instability due to policy
shifts has to be dealt with in order to secure that identifying restrictions on parameters are
meaningful. We therefore run break-point Chow tests30 for all series, which can be rejected
at the 1 % level for Slovenia and Lithuania; Polish in￿ ation data exhibit some instability,
which vanish once looking at the 5 % con￿dence level (see ￿gures 11-13). In fact we were
quite surprised by these results ourself, as there were changes taken place in the monetary
policy conduct in all three countries. However, as already mentioned above, monetary policy
was never as clear-cut as o¢ cials tried to explain to the public. There was always a policy
mix and a hybrid construct of using various instruments at the same time. In this light,
o¢ cially declared changes in monetary policy (if abstracting from ￿xed exchange rate rules)
gave only an indication that the balance of instruments used might have changed but not
that the country was facing a well-de￿ned regime change.
The determination of the lag length is another important issue, as VAR results are very
sensitive to the lag lengths used. We employ the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (see
table 2). We decided to use a lag length of 2 for all countries, which is a parsimonious
choice given our relatively short sample sizes.31 Note that we additionally ran Portmanteau
statistics as a goodness-of-￿t test for each equation in the systems that do not indicate any
misspeci￿cation.32 For the lag polynomial B (L) we only consider B (0) which enables us to
interpret the estimated parameters as elasticities.
Note that we consider two types of VARs. The ￿rst one (2.9) being the standard for-
mulation and the second one including a measure of in￿ ation expectations (2.17). We will
discuss the results country-by-country ￿rst and then compare the two setups to each other.
The empirical analysis is conducted with two software programmes, GiveWin (PcGive
Version 2.10) and Structural VAR (Version 0.31). Impulse responses are shown in ￿gures
14-19, where we also report the 95% con￿dence interval.
2.4.1 Results of the VAR without Expectations
Let us ￿rst consider the results for Poland. The responses for all variables seem all
reasonable from a theoretical point of view, although it is somehow surprising that the
negative impact on in￿ ation gets mildly reversed after 10 months and fades out completely
after 2.5 years. Especially the so-called price puzzle does not seem to be present, due to the
30The idea of the breakpoint Chow test is to test for any sizable di⁄erences in the estimated equations. A
signi￿cant di⁄erence indicates a structural change in the relationship.
31Note as well, that the AIC is known to favour higher VAR orders in comparison to other criteria, such
as the Schwarz Criterion (SC).
32Results are available on request.
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inclusion of the foreign commodity price in the vector of exogenous variables. The Slovenian
responses are less stringent. Most notably the monetary aggregate shows an unusual increase.
The 95% con￿dence intervals do not seem to narrow down after time, so there seems to be
a lot of "noise" in the model. Besides this, especially the initial responses of CPI are
satisfactory, although also here a positive e⁄ect starts to enter after 15 months.
For Lithuania things are di⁄erent, not only because of the di⁄ering exchange rate regime.
CPI responds sharply with no indication of a price puzzle However, the error bands are quite
large. There seems to be an e⁄ect of imported in￿ ation, which only slowly fades out after
about 4 years. Output seems to be only little e⁄ected, which is why we can conject that
exchange rate related stabilization policy entails a larger credibility and benign output losses.
2.4.2 Results of the VAR with Expectations
Let us now discuss the results of the VAR with expectations added to the vector of
exogenous variables. Remember that these variables are derived from Kalman ￿lter estimates
given historical in￿ ation data. The Kalman ￿lter, as mentioned before, is a special recursive
updating mechanism which can be compared to recursive least squares estimation. We
report the di⁄erent Kalman gains in table 11. As can be seen, the Kalman gain is largest in
Lithuania and smallest in Slovenia. Given that we are discussing the updating mechanism of a
time-varying estimation, this result can be interpreted that learning was faster in Lithuania
as it was in Poland and even faster than it turned out to be in Slovenia. The estimated
coe¢ cients point into the same direction as the estimated "learning speed". In economies
which managed to facilitate faster learning, the impact of in￿ ation expectations is more
pronounced.
In the case of Poland the introduction of expected in￿ ation changed the qualitative results
only for CPI, which does not exhibit the reversal to positive price e⁄ects of a monetary policy
shock anymore. Moreover, the con￿dence intervals of all variables narrowed down, which is
why we speculate that the precision of this model is much stronger. For Slovenia, the initial
price puzzle vanishes too, and also the precision of our estimates increased by large. Only
the impulse response of the monetary variable remains puzzling, which is strongly positive
initially, turns negative only after six months and reverses after just two years. Maybe this
indicates the inherent contradictions in Slovenian monetary policy mentioned earlier, where
heterodox policy measures were chosen until recently. The Lithuanian results also improve
in terms of their precision and the e⁄ects of the shock die out faster than under the basic
VAR setup. This somehow re￿ ects again that the fast learning behaviour in this country was
an important factor behind the successful disin￿ ation process, fueled of course by bought-in
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credibility via the currency board arrangement.
2.4.3 Summary of Results
All countries faced more or less hybrid disin￿ ationary strategies with sometimes con￿ ict-
ing policy goals as was discussed earlier. Whereas Poland￿ s and Slovenia￿ s main emphasis was
on interest rate measures, Lithuania embarked on a currency peg. The disin￿ ation achieved
under these monetary regimes are characterized by rapid elimination of hyperin￿ ation but
subsequent di⁄erences in the persistence of moderate in￿ ation. Especially the persistence of
in￿ ation in Slovenia is seen as puzzle due to enormous e⁄orts in ￿scal and monetary policies.
The dynamic responses that we yield from our VAR analyses are broadly consistent
with theoretical presumptions. This supports our identifying assumptions in the small-open
economy VAR. Most notably, there is almost no price puzzle present, which favours our
assumption of including exogenous variables such as foreign commodity prices in the VAR
setup. However, wide con￿dence bands indicate that we could do better.
In our second model, by introducing expected in￿ ation rates as an exogenous variable,
we can show that con￿dence bands tend to be narrower than before and most remaining
inconsistencies in impulse responses seem to vanish. This points to the fact that the infor-
mativeness of an extra exogenous variable somehow improved the e¢ ciency of our estimates.
Moreover, in all three countries the inclusion of in￿ ation expectations leads to faster adjust-
ments in the output variable. That implies that the e⁄ects of monetary policy are small and
transitory in those countries, in which private sector learning matters much, and are bigger
and more persistent in those countries, in which learning behaviour is less pronounced. This
has important implications not only for the monetary policy conduct but also for achievable
sacri￿ce ratios, where potential output losses are smaller in countries with faster private
sector learning.
2.4.4 Checking Robustness
Although impulse responses give a clear sign that our model setup is quite successful in
explaining real world phenomena, we performed a couple of robustness checks.33 We checked
for di⁄erences within sub-samples of our benchmark results, but ￿nd out that qualitative
e⁄ects of our baseline study are robust across sub-samples. However, one has to note that
these additional tests entail di¢ culties concerning the degree of freedom.
A second kind of check is due to Giordani (2004) who shows that adding a time trend
33Results are not reported here but are available on request.
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can lead to greater e¢ ciency of the results, as one accommodates for non-stationarity in the
data. We ￿nd out that the results are mixed and we do not see the clear improvement as in
Giordani (2004).
Last but not least we consider a larger number of lags in the VAR speci￿cation. As
mentioned earlier, there is always a trade-o⁄ for the degrees of freedom; we ￿nd out that
increasing the lag length does not change our results qualitatively and reduces the validity
of our estimates of the implied model by far.
2.5 Conclusions
It is unquestionable that in￿ ation expectations have a major impact on actual in￿ ation.
Thus, the management of private sector expectations has to be at the focus of any monetary
authority which tries to conduct a disin￿ ationary policy. This is particularly true for CEE
countries in which economic reform and transition were intense for the ￿rst decade after
liberalization, and forming in￿ ation expectations was an inherently di¢ cult task.
Our analysis was particularly motivated by a puzzle in the disin￿ ation processes of CEE
countries: While domestic monetary and ￿scal policies did not necessarily exhibit signs of
austerity, in￿ ation rates were decreasing at a rising speed in many countries. In other cases
in￿ ation remained above a certain threshold even though the macroeconomic environment
was sound. That is, the textbook-style link between monetary and ￿scal policies on the one
hand and the behaviour of the in￿ ation rate on the other hand was fuzzy. At least there
seems to be an indication that other factors mattered too. We believe that the expectations
formation process is such a factor and pose the hypothesis that learning behaviour matters
in the disin￿ ation process of CEE countries.
We introduce the expectational process by means of a recursive least-squares learning
rule, mirrored by Kalman ￿lter forecasts. That is, agents are perceived to behave like
econometricians: They do not know the relevant parameters of the model but use available
data and derive statistical inferences. These learning processes are incomplete and can only
be boundedly rational, which emphasizes the importance for the monetary authorities to
give clear signals to anchor in￿ ation expectations. This can substantially increase the speed
of learning by the private sector, similar to the description of Flemming￿ s (1976) "changing
gears".34 The Kalman gain, as a measure of the speed of adjustment of in￿ ation expectations,
34Flemming (1976) showed that the senstivity of the expected prices to current prices rises as the monetary
authority moves up through the ￿gears￿ . That is, monetary policy should be more aggressive, the more
private agents discount past dara.
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115732.5. CONCLUSIONS 46
is therefore not an arbitrary learning parameter, but rather determined by the behaviour of
the process under consideration.
We make use of a small-open economy VAR setup with two speci￿cations. Following
Peersman and Smets (2001), our ￿rst speci￿cation allows for contemporaneous interactions
of the exchange rate, money and the interest rate. This VAR speci￿cation yields surprisingly
stringent impulse responses for the three countries under concern. Most notable, the almost
standard price puzzle is almost absent.
Our second speci￿cation adds in￿ ation expectations as an exogenous variable to the
initial VAR setup. Expectations are derived from a time-varying recursive learning process
mirrored by using the Kalman ￿lter to generate "optimal" - in terms of estimated error
covariance - forecasts. We are able to show that when we relax the standard assumption of
rational expectations by adding expectations derived from learning processes, we are able to
improve our results in two aspects: While the qualitative results are not much di⁄erent to
the initial speci￿cation, the inclusion of in￿ ation expectations enhances the precision of our
estimates and produces responses which point to small and transitory e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks. Moreover we are able to capture a key issue of cross-country di⁄erences in
disin￿ ation by showing that countries with a higher speed of learning experience faster and
less burdensome disin￿ ation processes in terms of smaller sacri￿ce ratios.
But how can central banks try to pursue the "management of expectations" if it is of such
big importance for monetary policy? As Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) note, "[t]he absence
of publicly announced monetary targets [...] re￿ ects structural change and uncertainty"
which gives only little orientation for private sector in￿ ation forecasts. Gaspar et al. (2005)
show, that central banks behave optimally, if they try to "anchor in￿ ation expectations"
by decreasing the limiting variance of the private sector￿ s in￿ ation expectations. To put it
di⁄erently: if a central bank gives rise to unstable in￿ ation (expectations), it will be harder
to disin￿ ate due to slower adjustments of in￿ ation expectations.
Once can even go one step further and say that only central banks which conduct a cred-
ible monetary policy (with a transparent monetary target) facilitate private sector learning.
In that respect, a faster learning behaviour by the private sector can be seen as an indicator
for the quality of the policy conducted by the central bank.35;36
35Note that with rational expectations, which represents one end of the possible range of expectational
mechanisms, one would get an immediate response and adjustment to monetary policy changes.
36Looking at measures of central bank independence (such as the ones conducted by Dvorsky (2000) and
Cukierman et al. (2001)) for CEE countries shows that independence has an unsurprising correspondence
with the size of our estimated learning parameters. According to their studies, central bank independence is
higher in Lithuania and Poland as in Slovenia, where the ￿rst two countries cannot be ranked unambiguously.
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This has several implications for the speci￿c policy conduct of monetary authorities. As
Issing and Gaspar (2005) note, the presence of forward-looking variables in the economy
implies additional advantages apart from the credibility issues. The monetary authority can
in￿ uence economic outcomes by credibly in￿ uencing private sector expectations, which can
be perceived as an additional monetary policy channel. For that transparency in terms of
publishing monetary policy targets and relevant economic data should be given. Moreover,
codi￿ed central bank independence can be an important factor in facilitating private sector
learning, as it substantiates perceived credibility of policy targets, even if the monetary
authority has preferences for surprise in￿ ation.
Besides these interesting results, our analysis gives rise to two more questions, which
cannot be tackled in this paper but should be subject to future research. The ￿rst one
concerns the direct impact of the monetary policy reaction function on expected in￿ ation.
As in￿ ation is not part of our vector of endogenous variables, we have no impulse responses at
hand which can tell us something about this relationship. Related to this is the issue that if
learning depends on the actual in￿ ation experience, then any discretionary monetary policy
interacts with the speed of disin￿ ation. But in which way and how strong is this e⁄ect? To
give answers to this question, one would need to model the central bank behaviour in more
realistic way, which we have started working on with only very preliminary results.




INFORMATION DISCLOSURE THROUGH MARKET
ACTIVITY WITH AN APPLICATION TO MARKET
CRASHES
￿ We must look at the price system as a mechanism for communicating information if we want to
understand its real function.￿(Hayek (1945))
3.1 Introduction
If one considers a market in which agents￿information about the true state of nature is
incomplete, in planning his actions, how does an agent take into account what other agents
know about this true state? Is there a tendency that agents in this economy learn all the
collective information over time? And what role does the price system play in that context?
In standard (rational expectations based) ￿nancial market models, economic agents are
assumed to possess private, idiosyncratic information and to incorporate additional, pub-
licly available information. In determining whether to give a sell or buy order of an asset,
individual investors combine these two sources of information to derive rational decisions.
Due to this, the asset price is informative also about the private information of investors.
But how is private and public information being exactly aggregated in the market price?
Hayek￿ s (1945) critique of central planning suggests that the market process itself is able to
accomplish full aggregation. That is, through collective action of individually rational agents,
aggregation of dispersed information occurs, which results in prices that coincide with the
asset￿ s fundamentals. This line of argument was formalized at the end of the seventies, when
an in￿ uential literature has developed focusing attention on the transmission of information
through prices (see also box 1). According to Radner (1979), when the state space is ￿nite,
a rational expectations equilibrium exists generically, is ￿nite in number and fully revealing
in the sense that every agent can infer from prices alone the combined knowledge of all other
agents. Some economists therefore argue that theorems on the existence of fully revealing
equilibria support Hayek￿ s views on the virtues of the market as an information processor.
48
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115733.1. INTRODUCTION 49
Box 1 - Flow of Information
Rational expectations (hereafter RE) models suggest that markets achieve this result,
even though traders are unable to communicate information directly. Grossman (1976) was
the ￿rst one to analyze a market with n-types of informed agents, where each agent holds
only a part of the relevant information. In his model, the only source of uncertainty is the
liquidation value of the asset. Grossman (1976) shows that in such a case the price system
perfectly aggregates information.1 But if this hypothesis would prove to be true, how would
we deal with episodes of extreme market reversals such as the October 1987 crash, which
is di¢ cult to be justi￿ed by real news? Obviously there is a need to look more carefully at
individuals￿beliefs.
There are many possible ways to analyze how and why asset prices might deviate from
fundamentals in ￿nancial markets. One may model such deviations as some kind of ir-
rationality2 or as an equilibrium outcome of the interaction of rational agents. However,
whatever one￿ s approach is, one of the central questions in terms of market crashes is, how
agents coordinate their beliefs. One might think about anecdotal evidences (e.g. Kindle-
berger (1989)), sunspots (e.g. Greenspan (1996)), news e⁄ects etc. We argue that it is the
mere fact that information among agents is incomplete and asymmetric and that it takes
time to make inferences from initially given private information. This might result in a lumpy
and "hidden" adjustment process that causes what we perceive to be runs or panics in asset
markets. In this sense, we believe Kindleberger (1989) to be right that market reversals are
"foreshadowed by a gradual erosion of con￿dence in the market". However, this erosion is
not always visible to market participants.
The formal methodology which we employ is not new and goes back to Aumann (1976),
who considers common priors and common knowledge of posterior beliefs. Aumann (1976)
1The theoretical literature requires that a fully revealing price has to be a su¢ cient statistic of the market
for the unknown variable (i.e. the liquidiation value).
2See Shleifer (2000), Shiller (2000), or Thaler (1993) on issues of behavioural ￿nance.
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shows that under such circumstances, one cannot "agree to disagree", so posteriors need to
be equal. In a ￿nance context this could be interpreted as a case of initially asymmetric
information, in which ultimately all agents agree on the same valuation of an asset.
But the value of an asset is not only in￿ uenced by existing information. It also depends
on tomorrow￿ s price, so that investors naturally need to form expectations of future market
expectations. Therefore, in forming his decisions, an agent clearly faces two types of uncer-
tainty, fundamental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty. Fundamental uncertainty refers
to uncertainty concerning the payo⁄-relevant state of nature. Strategic uncertainty refers to
the uncertainty concerning the beliefs of other investors. Even if fundamental uncertainty
becomes smaller and smaller, strategic uncertainty may remain as large as ever. However,
when the informational environment of the economy changes for some reason, both funda-
mental uncertainty and strategic uncertainty will undergo changes. The net e⁄ect on the
outcomes will depend on the interplay of the two. This is especially true when the new
information received is public. As well as providing information on the underlying state,
public information plays a role in conveying information on what others believe and know,
and may work as a coordinating device.
We will focus on a stylized investment model with incomplete and asymmetric informa-
tion, which employs the notion of common knowledge. Note that investment decisions lead
to a positive net payo⁄only if the state is good and all other agents also choose to invest. For
payo⁄externalities to matter, agents would therefore need to exhibit both backward-looking
and forward-looking behaviour. In our model, we relax the rational expectations assumption
by assuming learning behaviour: agents observe the market price and use it together with
their private information to derive their investment decision. Agents are assumed to be per-
fect Bayesians and to that extent they are substantively rational. However, they do not take
into account the full hierarchy of higher-order beliefs ("beliefs about the beliefs ... about the
beliefs of others"). Our model builds directly on the seminal papers by Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982) who show that, employing the common prior assumption, convergence
of posterior beliefs takes place in ￿nite time. While they have to assume that agents directly
communicate their posterior beliefs with each other, we are able to show in chapter (3.4),
that it is su¢ cient if they can observe each others￿actions. This is already a big step towards
an adequate description of real world markets.
A second strand of this chapter is an extension of McKelvey and Talbot (1986), who
have shown that if an aggregate market statistic is made public, this can ultimately lead to
convergence of posterior beliefs. These two authors say that this aggregate statistic could
be the price system. However, they abstract from strategic complementarity which is an
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important ingredient of any ￿nancial market model. Once added to the model, we arrive at
our main result: Market crashes, de￿ned as a consensus on the agents￿willingness to sell
the asset at the same time, can take place without changes in external conditions provided
that the informativeness of the public signal (e.g. the market price) is not too high. We
will specify later what we mean by "not too high". Compared to the results of McKelvey
and Talbot (1986) this means that if the market price can be considered to be a su¢ cient
statistic, convergence of posterior beliefs will take place only under speci￿c circumstances.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. In
Section 3.3 we introduce Aumann￿ s (1976) famous "agreeing to disagree" result and describe
the Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) model. We also solve a numerical example for
the latter model. In section 3.4 we introduce our model and expand on Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis￿(1982) work by showing that direct communication of posterior beliefs can be
substituted by observing others￿actions only. We sketch how convergence of posteriors is ob-
tained by employing Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis￿(1982) numerical example. In section
3.5, only market prices are observable and we analyze how this in￿ uences the basic result.
We conclude by stating the main results and pointing at potential policy recommendations.
3.2 Related Literature
Our work is related to di⁄erent branches in ￿nance theory and information economics.
The assumption that prices reveal information has been extensively studied in the liter-
ature. Radner (1979) proves the generic existence of a fully revealing RE equilibrium under
the restriction that the mapping from signals to prices is invertible. Given that this assump-
tion does in general not hold, Jordan (1983) was able to show that there can be equilibria
that are not fully revealing. The assumption needed is that the dimension of the signal space
is larger than the dimension of the space of relative prices.
In models developed by Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980)
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1982), prices are prevented from fully revealing the funda-
mentals of the economy by assuming the existence of liquidity traders.
Radner (1979) resumes that "an economic agent who has a good understanding of the
market is in a position to use market prices to make inferences about the non-price informa-
tion received by other agents". But trading strategies that rely on interpretations of other
investors￿actions as revealed in prices can create and amplify noise.3 The results may be
3Note that the market price, besides its allocative function can ful￿ll an additional informational function
which is both bounded from below and above: It is bounded from below by the information contained in the
information held privately. It is bounded from above by the fully-revealing market price.
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markets characterized by price overreactions and instability, with intermittent price run-ups
followed by sudden price reversals.
While the role of information in price formation has also been a concern of ￿nance re-
searchers, there have been only few models of speculative behaviour with heterogeneously
informed agents. Based on Kyle (1985), a sizeable literature on models with identically in-
formed agents has been developed, being unable to address the issues of information aggre-
gation. It was only due to the 1987 stock market crash that a sudden interest in information-
based explanations recurred, as the drop in asset prices at that time was not accompanied
by any major news and could not be explained by standard models. Subsequently, most
models of market crashes tried to explain market crashes by introducing explanations that
come from outside the model. In sunspot examples, such as Allen et al. (1993) and Sandroni
(1998), there are multiple equilibria and agents observe the realization of a uninformative
public signal, a sunspot. This signal changes agents￿beliefs and serves as a coordination de-
vice to move from one equilibrium to another. This shift might cause drastic price changes
that deviate from fundamental values. However, the idea that an intrinsically useless signal
can have an in￿ uence on the real economy is somehow puzzling. Even if it is only supposed
to work as a coordination device, it seems to undermine the rationality assumption of agents
strongly. Other examples of models of market crashes include models of liquidity shortage
and news models (see the excellent review by Brunnermeier (2001)). Models with news ef-
fects (e.g. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)) are somewhat similar in character to sunspot
explanations. The di⁄erence is that public signals/news are supposed to be informative.
However, their main impact is again that of a coordination device, which causes a dispropor-
tionate e⁄ect relative to their intrinsic information content. The shortcoming here is that
real world market crashes often do not behave like that (cf. Kindleberger (1989)), the most
notable example of a market crash without sizeable news being the crash of the Dow Jones
in October 1987. Also experimental work (e.g. Plott and Sunder (1988)) has shown that
market crashes do not need to be accompanied by any public signal or news.
The papers closest to ours are those of Gavious and Mizrahi (2000) and Hart and Tauman
(2004), which in fact uses almost the same principle idea as we do in section (3.4). Their
model, however, has two shortcomings. Firstly they give an example of market crashes in
cases in which the true state of the world is good, where this result strongly hinges on their
decision rule which is not derived from ￿rst principles. Moreover, they do not really look
at a ￿nance context, as the inclusion of prices adds an additional dimension to the model,
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namely strategic complementarities, which is not given in their setup.4
As mentioned in the introduction, strategic uncertainty is at the core of any ￿nance ap-
plication. The literature on coordination and higher-order beliefs commences with Halpern
(1986) and Rubinstein (1989). Subsequently, in the 1990s, various contributions of Stephen
Morris and his coauthors have emphasized the importance of common knowledge and higher-
order beliefs and focused on various ￿nance applications. Morris et al. (1995) provide condi-
tions under which qualitative results of models without higher-order beliefs can be reversed
when those beliefs are added to models of asymmetric information. More precisely they can
identify necessary conditions for the existence of bubbles in ￿nancial models, i.e. the depth
of knowledge5 must not be too big.
What these authors disregard is that investment can lead to a positive payo⁄ only if
other agents do not choose to disinvest at the same time. Thus, there is some kind of payo⁄
externality (called strategic complementarity (cf. Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), in which
each player￿ s marginal utility of increasing his strategy rises with increases in other agents￿
strategies. Only if this additional aspect is taken into account, a ￿nancial market model
entails not only backward-looking, but also forward-looking elements.
The papers closest to ours, are Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and McKelvey
and Talbot (1986). Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis￿(1982) main result is that one can
construct an indirect communication equilibrium6 in which revisions of individual actions
only take place in the last period. McKelvey and Talbot (1986) translate this result into
a model, in which some aggregate public statistic is su¢ cient for convergence of posterior
beliefs.7 However, this result implicitly assumes a one-to-one relationship between posterior
beliefs and actions, which in terms of a ￿nancial market model with binary action is not
valid. If the set of actions is discrete, a particular decision can be based on a large amount
of di⁄erent beliefs.
3.3 Learning through Direct Communication
An information structure for agent i is a set of possible states of nature and a function
that assigns to each state a non-empty subset of states. More formally, we are talking about
4The idea of pushing the direct communication case of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) one step
forward and looking at prices instead of posterior beliefs was given by these authors in their concluding
remarks to above paper.
5A state space ￿ whose states specify ￿rst-order knowledge is said to have depth equal to one (cf. Morris
et al. (1995)). Depth of knowledge of order n is de￿ned correspondingly.
6Which implies convergence of posteriors to some equilibrium posterior, simply by communicating pos-
teriors between agents back and forth.
7Nielsen et al. (1990) generalize these results to conditional expectations.
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a measurable space (￿;z), where ￿ is the state space, that is the set of possible states of the
world and z is a function that assigns to each state ! a nonempty subset of states z(!):
We assume ￿ to be ￿nite and any nonempty subset of ￿ is called an event, A.
Aumann￿ s (1976) seminal paper showed that if two rational agents (we call them Alice
and Bob, or simply ￿ and ￿ from now onwards) start from a common prior and posterior
beliefs are common knowledge between them, they cannot "agree to disagree" about the
probability of an event A: That is, updating the probability of event A on the basis of
private information cannot lead to an ultimately di⁄erent assessment of the probability of
A:
Proposition 3.1 (cf. Aumann (1976)) Consider a set of possible states ￿: Posterior be-
liefs of ￿ and ￿ about an event A ￿ ￿ are common knowledge between them and both have
the same prior distribution over ￿. Then posterior beliefs must be equal.
Proof. See Aumann (1976).
Intuitively, Aumann￿s result says that di⁄erences in information alone are not a valid
source of belief heterogeneity. Bacharach (1985) extends the results to an n-person setup,
which does not alter the basic result. It is not surprising that Aumann￿result formed the
basis for a large literature, both in game theory ("interactive epistemology"), economics,
￿nance and beyond.8 However, the assumption that posterior beliefs are common knowledge
is quite strong. We will now see whether relaxing this assumption will change the basic
result.9
3.3.1 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) - Revisited
The convergence result of Aumann (1976) holds also if posterior beliefs are not common
knowledge but are communicated back and forth between ￿ and ￿ and both revise their
posteriors after each round of communication. This is the famous result of Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982), which we will brie￿ y reformulate now.
Consider the ￿nite set ￿ of possible states of the world, where
￿ = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9g:
We say that a state of the world provides a full description of all important aspects. A subset
A ￿ ￿ is called an event. We say that this event is realized if the true state of the world
8A special application of Aumann￿ s (1976) result is Milgrom and Stokey￿ s (1982) no-trade theorem and
Tirole￿ s (1982) impossibility result of speculation in rational expectations contexts.
9Note that the assumption of common priors is crucial for Aumann ￿ s (1976) result. This assumption is
among the most disputed ones, see e.g. Morris (1995) and Bonanno and Nehring (1998) for an exhaustive
discussion.
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! 2 ￿ is in A: There are two agents, ￿ and ￿, and their private information is modelled in
terms of partitions of the state space, denoted as P￿ and P￿ for ￿ and ￿ respectively. A
partition is a collection of subsets of ￿, which need to be disjoint and have ￿ as the union.
Being better informed means in that context that you have a "￿ner" partition, i.e. you are
more sure about the true state of the world. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) consider
the following partitions, which are supposed to be common knowledge:
P￿ = ff1;2;3g;f4;5;6g;f7;8;9gg
P￿ = ff1;2;3;4g;f5;6;7;8g;f9gg: (3.1)
The smaller a particular partition cell, the better is the information of the agent. For
example, if the true state of the world would be !￿ = 9, ￿ would know it for certain, whereas
￿ would know it only with probability 1/3.
Both agents have common priors of the set of states of the world, p￿ (!) = p￿ (!) = 1=9
for all ! 2 ￿: Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) consider that ￿ and ￿ are able to
communicate directly with each other. More precisely they announce posterior beliefs to
each other and each agent revises his or her own beliefs by using the additionally acquainted
information. The revision process itself is a simple Bayesian updating rule.10
To see how the updating and learning process works, consider an example. Denote p
j
i as





















Let !￿ = 3 be the true state of the world and let us consider the event A = f3;6;9g to be
the bad outcome: This setup implies that ￿ is informed that the true state of the world lies
in p1
￿, while ￿ is informed that the true state of the world is in p1
￿: ￿￿ s posterior beliefs for
10Bayes￿ Rule is a natural way to derive the conditional probability prob(Ai j B); if prob(Ai) and
prob(B j Ai) are known (i = 1;2;:::;n). In this context, B is an event with prob(B) 6= 0; and A1;A2;:::;An
are pairwise disjunct events with P (Ai) 6= 0 8i and A1 [ A2 [ ::: [ An = ￿: Bayes￿Rule then says that
prob(Ai j B) =
prob(B j Ai)prob(Ai)
Pn
j=1 prob(B j Aj)prob(Aj)
; for i = 1;2;:::;n:
Using the total probability formula, this expression is identical to
prob(B)prob(Ai j B) = prob(Ai)prob(B j Ai); for i = 1;2;:::;n:
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Why do we consider all partition cells here, although we know that the true state of the
world is !￿ = 3? The reason is that this information is mutual but not common knowledge!
As Rubinstein (1989) illustrates, a game in which a particular piece of information is common
knowledge can behave profoundly di⁄erent to a game in which this information is mutually
known up to some ￿nite order, no matter how many orders one takes into account. We
therefore have to consider the whole state space ￿: In our particular example, ￿ would
communicate a posterior of 1/3 and ￿ a posterior of 1/4. To ￿ this entails hardly any news,
but ￿ can infer from ￿￿ s posterior that the true state can not be ! = 9: The "common
knowledge state space" has thus reduced to ￿0 = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g. Step by step this
revision process leads us to posterior beliefs which are 1/3, where no further revision takes
place as both ￿ and ￿ have exactly the same opinion.
Proposition 3.2 (cf. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982)) Under the assumption
that the two information partitions are ￿nite, given any event A, the revision process con-
verges in ￿nitely many steps.
Proof. See Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982).
This result is quite strong. Not only does direct communication lead to a convergence of
posterior beliefs, which relaxes Aumann￿ s assumption of common knowledge, the result also
shows that this convergence takes place in ￿nite time if both partitions are ￿nite.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) are able to show another interesting fact. It
may be that the revision process is "hidden", in the sense that posterior beliefs are revised
after each period, but no apparent revision in actions occurs until the ￿nal round. That
is, a small change in information of agents is not necessarily re￿ ected in a (small) change
in action. We see this result as a valid starting point for analyses of ￿nancial markets, in
which crashes are not apparently accompanied by bad news hitting the market or other
obvious reasons for an abrupt price reversal. The "hidden" process of gradual convergence
of posterior beliefs of market participants might be a key here, where information changes
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gradually while individual action changes abrupt between buy and sell orders. We will set up
a stylized model in the next section, which nests the setup of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982).
3.4 Learning from Observing Others￿Actions
In many economic situations, agents possess private information that is imperfectly cor-
related with the true state of nature. If information of agents is asymmetric, they might be
able to infer some of the privately held information from other agents. One way in which
this might happen is through direct communication. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982)
have shown that if two players have common priors and ￿nite information partitions, re-
peated communication of posteriors will induce a common posterior in ￿nite time, that is
agents￿posterior beliefs become identical (see chapter (3.3.1)) Thus, direct communication
of posterior beliefs ultimately leads to a state in which no further revisions occur.
The question is what happens, if direct communication is not feasible, as is true for many
real world markets, especially ￿nancial ones? We introduce a model of social learning, in
which agents take decisions that can be observed and agents might be able to infer some
of the privately held information from these actions. Agents can not, however, directly
communicate with each other, so it is only the channel of observing others￿ s actions through
which the level of common knowledge about the true state improves. Or to put it di⁄erently:
Trading activity itself plays an essential role in both the release and the dissemination of
privately held information.
Let us consider a two-player investment game, where the ￿nite state space ￿ consists of
nine states ￿ = f1;2;3;:::;9g with equal prior probabilities. There are two agents, ￿ and ￿,
also called investors, who will decide in each period whether they want to invest or disinvest.
If both investors disinvest at the same time, we de￿ne this reaction as a market crash.
Consider that we can divide the outcomes of each state of nature into two groups: bad
outcomes and good outcomes. Let f1;3;6;7;8;9g denote the states in which one yields the
bad liquidation value and f2;4;5g to be the states with a good liquidation value. We assign
a zero liquidation value for the asset in a bad state and a liquidation value of one in a
good state. For the decision rule this implies that "invest if the expected return is strictly
higher than the initial posterior belief ", and "disinvest if the expected return is not strictly
higher than the initial posterior belief" is the action pro￿le for both agents. Note that both
investors initially face an expected payo⁄ of 1/3.
In period t; agents￿private information is described by means of information partitions.
A partition has to be a collection of subsets (called cells) that are mutually disjoint and have
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a union ￿. In our example, consider that agents initially have the following partitions:11
P￿ = ff1;2;3g;f4;5;6g;f7;8;9gg
for agent ￿ and
P￿ = ff1;2;3;4g;f5;6;7;8g;f9gg
for agent ￿: Let us de￿ne the cells of ￿￿ s partition in period t as p1
￿;t; p2
￿;t; p3
￿;t: ￿￿ s cells
are de￿ned accordingly. We assume that agents know each others￿partition.
Let A be a bad event and assume that A = f3;6;9g, thus representing the bad outcome.
We assume that both agents know that they are facing a bad market outcome (i.e. event A
occurred).12 Assume further that the true state of nature is !￿ = 3. As in Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982), in the case of the true state !￿ the agents are informed to which cell
p
j
i;t (￿) the true state belongs. If this cell is not a singleton, we can imagine that everybody
knows the true state only with some noise.
In the subsequent paragraphs we will show that a crash will occur, which will be caused
by the information transmission between agents only. While we assume that direct communi-
cation of posterior beliefs does not take place but only actions are observable, we nevertheless
will get a result similar to the one in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) in that no ob-
vious revision occurs until the last period. In particular, agent ￿ will disinvest and agent ￿
will invest in the asset and after several trading periods both investors want to disinvest at
the same time. As mentioned before, we interpret this action pro￿le as a crash.
Period 1 We begin by de￿ning the set of states which is common knowledge in t = 0: As
shown above, it turns out to be the whole state space, that is ￿: Moreover, we again assume
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11Our description of the state space is taken from Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982).
12As mentioned before, if you consider the pair h￿;zi we de￿ne z to be the information function for
the set ￿. Given this de￿nition, an agent who knows z(!) ￿ A; knows that some state in the event A
has occurred. We say that the agent knows A. Or in the words of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982):
￿ Given ! 2 ￿, an event A is called common knowledge at ! if A includes that member of the meet of the
two partitions that contains !.￿In our case the meet of the two partitions is ￿ itself, so the assumption is
satis￿ed.
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How can we interpret these results and what implications does this have for the actions
of agents? Take the case of agent ￿. He holds prior beliefs and has incomplete private
information about the true state. His initial posterior beliefs are 1/3 for the bad state which
yields and initial expected payo⁄ of 2/3. Recall that exactly three states of the world yield
a positive outcome while six states of the world yield a good one. Thus posterior beliefs of
1/3 just leave him indi⁄erent. We proposed the decision rule that only in cases of strictly
positive expected payo⁄s, agents invest. Thus, agent ￿ disinvests. In addition he has beliefs
about the other agent￿ s beliefs. Since ￿ knows agent ￿￿ s partition, ￿ knows that if the true
state is in p1
￿;1 or p2
￿;1; then agent ￿￿ s conditional probability for the event A is 1/4. Given
that three out of nine states are bad states, a posterior probability for the bad outcome of
1/4 leads agent ￿ to invest. If, however, the true state would be f9g, agent ￿ would know
that for sure (i.e. with probability 1) and thus would disinvest, as his expected payo⁄ in
that case would be zero.
Agent ￿, as mentioned above, knows for himself in which cell of the partition the true
state is and this is p1
￿;1; but agent ￿ does not know that agent ￿ knows that.13 We therefore
have to compute the probabilities for all cells. However, the behaviour of the agents takes
into consideration that they know for themselves in which cell the true state is. Thus, for











￿: As one can see, this leads to an investment decision of agent ￿ and a disinvestment decision
of agent ￿ in the ￿rst period.
Besides the decision process of the investors, there is an informational context that we
need to discuss. As agents observe each other￿ s actions, ￿ knows that ￿ invested. He can
thus conclude, that the true state of nature cannot be f9g: In fact agent ￿ also knows that
f9g is not true state and moreover he knows that agent ￿ knows that he knows that etc. As
in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) f9g can be deleted from the "common knowledge
state space" and the new meet encloses f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g:
13Note that A knows that the true state is in p1
A; so what he can infer is that agent B also thinks that the
true state is in his ￿rst cell, namely p1
B: However, B could think that A thinks that the true state is in p2
A,
as for instance f4g is part of the second cell of A￿ s partition.
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Period 2 Agents can now derive their new posterior according to
￿ :
8
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The actions that are implied by these posteriors are the same ones as in period 1: agent
￿ disinvests and agent ￿ invests in the asset. When looking at the market, nothing new has
taken place. Neither has there been an increase in exogenous information or news, nor has
there been a revision of actions. However, also in this case agents can learn from each other￿ s
actions. Most notably it is now common knowledge that the remaining elements in p3
￿ can
be ruled out. To see this, remember that states f7;8g are states with a positive payo⁄ and
agent ￿ would have been irrational if he would have been disinvesting in such a state. The
meet thus becomes further re￿ned and is now f1;2;3;4;5;6g:




























































respectively. These results imply again that it is optimal for agent ￿ to disinvest in the
asset and for agent ￿ to buy it. Again, this generates further information for the market, as
p2
￿ can be ruled out, as agent ￿ did not disinvest. This further reduces elements f5;6g from
our set of possible true states of nature, the meet therefore becomes f1;2;3;4g:
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Action pro￿les are still the same, namely ￿ disinvests and ￿ invests. However, statef4g
can be commonly ruled out as agent ￿ disinvested. Note that the meet becomes f1;2;3g:













































That is, agent ￿ disinvests, and agent ￿ decides to sell the asset in period 5 as well after
investing in the asset in all initial rounds. Note that, although ￿ was learning continuously
from period one to ￿ve, the additional information in the ￿rst four rounds did not make any
di⁄erence to him in terms of his decision making process. It is only in period 5 that the
￿ amount of common knowledge￿has surpassed a certain threshold that makes him change
his action. To say it di⁄erently, the meet has reached a certain level, beyond which no further
revision will take place.
The fact that both agents want to sell the asset is a phenomenon that we de￿ned as a
￿ market crash￿ . As the liquidation value of the asset is zero, agent ￿, who was buying the
asset in all preceding periods, did wrong and ￿nally recognizes that he should sell the asset
as well.
3.4.0.1 Remarks
The most remarkable distinction in this example is the di⁄erence between the concepts
of knowledge and belief. When knowledge is formalized as here, an agent cannot know
something that is false, he can just believe it. That is, if the player knows and event A, then
A is true and the true state lies in A:
Note moreover that no agent has superior information. A ￿ner information partition is
the formal de￿nition for better information. Not all information partitions are re￿nements
or coarsenings of each other, so as in our case, we cannot rank them. Whether a partition is
better than any other depends on the true state and the event A: However, note that having
superior information with respect to the true state of nature, which would apply for agent
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￿ in our case, does not necessarily provide a strategic tangible advantage. Thus, improving
the privately held information does not induce an inevitable increase in equilibrium payo⁄s.
However, the assumption that agents can observe each others￿actions is not very realistic,
especially in a deep and decentralized ￿nancial market. It is much more realistic to assume
agents to observe the market price instead of others￿actions only. We will now proceed with
a formal model that incorporates this idea.
3.5 Learning from Market Prices
We analyze the dynamics of a discrete multiperiod ￿nancial market with (public) secu-
rities. Those assets are completely characterized by their payo⁄s at a terminal date T. We
assume that the terminal payo⁄equals one in the good state and zero in the bad state. Trade
of the securities occurs at each t = 1;:::;T: The security is a claim on the fundamental state
of the economy which is not directly observable. For simplifying and comparative purposes
we follow Aumann (1976) and concentrate on ￿nite state space of nine possible states of
nature, that is ￿ = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9g: Each state occurs with probability prob(!) = 1
9
8 ! 2 ￿: The states are to be thought of as alternative possible descriptions of whatever is
relevant to the agents. Thus, only one state is the true state, but no agent knows which one
it is. The true state can be either good (G) or bad (B).
We consider a two-player model with agents i = f￿;￿g being risk neutral14 with a zero
discount rate. Each agent i receives an endowment of a perishable consumption good at
times 0;1;:::;T according to
ei = fei;0;:::;ei;Tg
and is assumed to be an expected utility maximizers. In this two-player setup, the agents
neglect their possible market power and do not consider the informational externalities that
their actions cause.
Note that in our case agents￿information is both asymmetric15 and incomplete. Note
moreover that although one agent has an informational lead with respect to certain possible
states of nature, the entire information structures are such that no agent has superior infor-
mation.16 This implies that neither of the two agents has an ex-ante comparative advantage
by being better informed than his opponent.
14If agents would be risk averse, there would typically be a deviation between the expected value of the
asset and the price that agents are willing to pay. Or to put it di⁄erently: The more risk averse agents are,
the less sensitive is their reaction towards prices and prices would therefore be badly-revealing or in the limit
non-revealing.
15The asymmetry of information among agents is an essential ingredient for prices to have an informational
role.
16A partition Ii is ￿ner than partition I￿i if and only if every cell of Ii is a subset of some cell in I￿i:
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/115733.5. LEARNING FROM MARKET PRICES 63
We focus on a simultaneous-move investment game, in which both agents can decide to
invest (I) or to disinvest (D) the asset, that is




The utility of agent i is a⁄ected not only by his own action but also by the true state of
nature and the action of the other agent, that is agent i￿ s utility entails both fundamental
and strategic uncertainty,
ui : fG;Bg ￿ S ! R: (3.3)
Agents investment or disinvestment decision is such that they announce a bid ￿ at which
they are willing to buy/sell and communicate this bid ￿ to a competitive market maker.
The bid is interpreted as an investment decision if ￿ is lower than the market price and vice
versa. The market maker sets the price at the highest market clearing level, i.e.
pt+1 = inf fp : Dt (p) ￿ It (p)g: (3.4)
Consider also the graphical representation of the timing of decisions in ￿gure 2.
Figure 2 - Sequencing of Decisions
As in chapter (3.4), the event A is the bad outcome and A = f3;6;9g: For illustrative
purposes assume again that the true state of the world is !￿ = 3: In contrast to chapter 3,
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we abandon the assumption of common knowledge of the partitional information structure.
That is, agents know and observe only their own information structure and the market price
announced by the market maker. The true state of nature is located in the ￿rst cell }1
i(!)




















































as the security￿ s payo⁄ is either zero or one.












Note that the two bids are di⁄erent, which is the prerequisite for trade to take place.
The market maker now uses his pricing formula (3.4), which yields a ￿rst
market clearing price at p1 = 2
3: At this market price, ￿￿ s bid will be executed as a
sell-order and ￿
0s bid will be interpreted as a buy-order. Clearly, this price is informative to
both agents. Agent ￿ learns that ￿ obviously holds a higher reservation price et vice versa.
How do agents incorporate this additional information in the analysis for next period￿ s bid
￿￿;2?
We assume for simplicity that agents follow a linear rule while adjusting their private
information: They move towards other agents￿reservation price at a ￿xed speed c: But the
previous bid of the other agent could not be detected, as only the market price and the own
information partition are known to each agent. If ￿￿i would be known to agent i, we could
derive
￿i;2 = (1 ￿ c)￿i;1 + c￿￿i;1: (3.7)
Note that if you look at the informational e¢ ciency of the market price, it is clearly
bounded from below by the information contained in the information held privately. It is
moreover bounded from above by the fully-revealing market price. This implies that instead
of using the unobservable ￿￿i, agents take a proxy. Note that agent ￿ just forms a belief
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about the occurrence of event A: It might be that event A did not materialize and the
higher bid of the other agent might be an indicator for that (i.e. that the terminal payo⁄ is
non-zero). ￿ therefore proceeds by using the terminal payo⁄of event : A as a proxy for ￿￿;
￿￿;2 = (1 ￿ c)￿￿;1 + c:
Let￿ s assume that the responsiveness toward the market price is symmetric, i.e. also
agent ￿ adjusts with a ￿xed speed c: However, his initial bid turned out to be higher than
the resulting market price which leaves them suspicious of having a too optimistic market
assessment. He therefore adjusts his expectations ￿ downwards￿according to
￿￿;2 = (1 ￿ c)￿￿;1:
From this one can easily see that agent ￿￿ s bid will still be lower than that one of agent
￿ if




In this case, next period￿ s market price will lie in between the individuals￿bids of last pe-
riod. As becomes clear, the price change is again informative to both agents and we therefore
assume that they take the price change into consideration for their updating behaviour.
As prices are publicly observable by both agents, they are common knowledge. Let us
denote the price change as
pt+1 ￿ pt = ￿t+1: (3.8)
Note that this price change can be interpreted as some additional news. While it does
not add any extra information to the market, it clearly entails extra information for each
agent on the other agent￿ s information set, which were not present before.
An elegant way to model the impact of this new information on beliefs is to use the
DeGroot (2004) notion of a gamma distribution, i.e.
￿ (￿￿ ja;b); (3.9)
where ￿￿ is the mean of the observable price change, and a and b are the mean and
variance of the gamma distribution with a > 1 and b > 0. Consider that agents update their
beliefs according to
￿ (￿￿ ja;b + c￿): (3.10)
Given the belief process (3.9) and a current price pt, we can say that
Proposition 3.3 Agent i￿ s optimal next period bid ￿i;t+1 is given by ￿i;t+1 =
(b￿cpt)t
(a￿1￿c):
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Proof. Agent i needs to maximize E [1 ￿ pt+1 jpt+1 ￿ ￿]prob(pt+1 ￿ ￿): Agent i0s ￿rst-
order condition is then given by
￿ = E f1 ￿ pt+1 ja;b;￿g =
b + c(￿ ￿ pt)
a ￿ 1
;
which has as a unique solution for ￿ for a 6= 1 and c 6= 0:
Note that from the optimal bid of agent i we can infer that expected positive payo⁄s
are decreasing in the current price pt. This is a fairly intuitive result: The higher today￿ s
price, the lower is the expected pro￿t from investing in the asset if the potential gain (here
positive payo⁄of 1) is limited. That is, the higher the current market price converges to the
maximum liquidation value of the asset, the lower expected pro￿ts from investment are.
Given our parametrization we can now go one more step ahead to derive at an interesting
result: Market crashes, de￿ned as a consensus on the agents￿willingness to sell the asset
at the same time, can take place without changes in external conditions. The condition
is that the variance of the mean expected payo⁄ has to be higher than a measure of the
responsiveness towards the other agent￿ s information.
Proposition 3.4 A market crash is taking place if
b > ￿c; (3.11)
and ￿> 0:
Proof. In period t + 1 both agents want to disinvest in the asset, if




for ￿ = (￿ ￿ pt) 1￿a
a￿1 > 0:
Note that ￿ is positive, if the the bid is lower than the current market price, so we are
in the midst of a downturn. If proposition (3.4) is satis￿ed, both agents want to disinvest in
the asset due to non-positive expected returns. We interpret this results as a market crash.
This result deserves further interpretation. Firstly, we can say that - ceteris paribus - the
lower the responsiveness towards the other agent￿ s information (measured by the adjustment
factor c) the more likely we are facing a situation in which we exhibit a market crash. As c is
a measure for social learning behaviour, we can say that the less pronounced social learning
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behaviour in ￿nancial markets is, i.e. the more agents just look at prices and their own
information for taking investment decisions, the more likely the market will face a crash.
Social learning behaviour can thus be seen as an "insurance" for the market for crashes not
to take place.
These ￿ndings do not come as a surprise. In our setup, agents are endowed with asym-
metric and incomplete information. Pooling available private information via direct com-
munication would yield a ￿rst-best market outcome, but we assume that this does not take
place. Instead, agents can learn from the market price only. The more agents disregard the
valuable information of other agents as partially mirrored in market prices, the more likely
they are missing important information for rating the asset.
We can look at condition (3.11) also from another angle: b is the measure for variance
of the expected price change. If prices are perceived to be very volatile, it is di¢ cult for
agents to obtain any valuable information from them. On the other hand, the lower the price
variability, the easier it is for agents to extract privately held information from the aggregate
statistic and market crashes are less likely taken place.
3.6 Discussion of Results and Concluding Remarks
The role of prices in aggregating and revealing privately held information is central to the
study of allocative e¢ ciency in any market. Despite this importance, economists (and even
more policy makers) still know very little about the actual mechanism how these diverse bits
of information are aggregated and disseminated. This proves particularly true in ￿nancial
markets, where information is abundant and expectations of investors are at least partially
endogenously generated by their own collective activity.
We have tried to shed some light on the question, whether market reversals or crashes
can be explained without imposing news e⁄ects, sunspots or other external factors. We have
done this in two steps. In the ￿rst step we took Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis￿(1982) setup
and showed that if agents are only able to observe each others￿actions (instead of directly
communication with each other as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982)), we will get
market crashes in ￿nite time. The result can be explained by a "mute revision process",
whereby agents are both asymmetrically and incompletely informed about the true state of
nature and learn from each other and revise their beliefs. Only after a certain threshold of
additional information is gained, this results in a potential change in action.
In the second case under consideration, we abstain from assuming that agents can observe
each others￿actions. Instead, we suppose that only an aggregate of individuals expectations
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becomes common knowledge, namely the market price. By allowing public signals that
convey partial information about what others know, we incorporate an incentive for social
learning into our investment model. Moreover, we restrict agents to learn only from market
prices and not directly from each other. This seems to be the most sensible assumption
for large markets, such as ￿nancial ones. We are able to derive a necessary condition for a
market crash to take place. We can see that social learning behaviour can be regarded as
a means of preventing market crashes. The less pronounced this social learning is, the more
likely the market ends up in a crash. Or as Surowiecki (2005) would say: There exists some
"wisdom of the crowds" and there is no a priori reason that learning from others will lead
to herd-like behaviour.
A question that we did not tackle in our chapter is, whether we can ￿nd conditions on
the agents￿partitions under which market crashes are taken place or not. It is clear that
if both agents would be symmetrically incompletely informed, no social learning could take
place and therefore no dynamics in our model. It is the asymmetry of information which
drives our results. We mentioned that in our setup no agent is strictly better informed than
the other one. An important question to answer would how big the asymmetry needs to be
in terms of market crashes to take place, and secondly whether there is some upper bound
on asymmetry beyond which our results are not con￿rmed. Unfortunately we were not able
to give any clear answer to this.17
We are also aware that the results we present, are at least partly contingent on the
particular pricing rule of the market maker and other assumptions taken. It is thus more of
a parametric example instead of a general characterization of situations in which ￿nancial
market crashes take place without news. However, we believe that some of the results, e.g.
that social learning behaviour matters as it re￿nes the meet and thus allows for more precise
judgements of markets, will translate into a more general setup. The applied simpli￿cation
did, however, also have some good thing about it. In particular we were able to understand
the interaction between private sector updating behaviour and social learning processes.
Moreover, we are also able to say that improving the common knowledge state space, e.g.
by disseminating market related data which are otherwise not given, is socially bene￿cial as
it prevents some agents to embark on the wrong ￿nancial investment. In this sense we can
conclude that when regarding ￿nancial markets, some news is in most cases better than no
news.
17We introduced a topology on ￿ and tried to ￿nd conditions on (a) the measure of entropy within the
individual information partitions and (b) a cardinal measure for di⁄erences between information partitions
necessary to create market crashes. We are not in the position yet to give an answer to these important
questions.
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A. The Assumption of a Representative Agent
Dating back to Alfred Marshall and Lionel Robbins, the representative agent assumption
has been a landmark in the history of economic theory. However, its use and usefulness in
macroeconomic theory has been questioned ever since its proposal (for an excellent summary
of the arguments see Kirman (1993)).
In the representative agent hypothesis, to derive aggregate relationships for macroeco-
nomic theory is generally performed by solving the representative agent￿ s maximization prob-
lem and inserting aggregate values. Thus, individual behaviour is seen as equivalent to the
aggregate behaviour. Hartley (1997) questions, what this kind of agent is: Some mean or
median? And what does representative mean after all?
Representation is an abstract term, used ever since the middle ages. Historically, there
exist di⁄erent concepts of representation, such as symbolic, absolutist, national and corporate
representation; the use in economic theory is closest to what is called identity representation.
It basically means that the representing part equals the whole, which entails some notion of
consensus.
While the representative agent assumption makes many problems tractable, however,
many economic problems at hand cannot be dealt with at all, as they necessarily need some
notion of heterogeneity. One possible alternative might therefore be to analyze a single
agent￿ s decision problem and then try to infer aggregate relationships without sticking to
identical preferences and endowments. But aggregation faces serious problems. For macro-
economic relations to make sense, it is for instance required that a particular distribution of
an aggregate variable is consistent and not subject to considerable change with respect to
news. The most well-known consistency condition is the Gorman-form on preferences, which
requires that Engel-curves are parallel straight lines for any set of prices. Note moreover
that the Sonnenschein-Mantel results highlighted already 25 years ago that it is impossible
to derive aggregate implications starting with general equilibrium models.
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So what might be the future of representative agent models? We would strongly believe
that disaggregating the macroeconomic problem and modelling speci￿c parts of the economy
with more care could be one of the roads. Of course this means a dismantling of mainstream
general equilibrium theory, but for the bene￿t of much stronger results.
B. Expectations and Learning Behaviour in Psychology
The case for using psychology in economic theory has been given long before Alan
Greenspan￿ s ￿ irrational excuberance￿talk (1996). Kahneman et al. (1982) showed that
the probabilistic assessments of agents often do not follow a rational judgement. Instead,
￿heuristic principles￿are often used which try to reduce the complexity of the problem at
hand, leading to systematic departures from rationality. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) at-
tribute this partly to what they call the ￿law of small numbers￿ , that is agents believe that
the likelihood for some event in a small number of repetitions is roughly the same as the law
of large numbers suggests. But there are other biases in agents decision making:
￿ Cognitive dissonance, i.e. adhering to a speci￿c point of view despite counterfactual
evidence.
￿ Anchoring, i.e. searching for reference points that provide assistance in the decision-
making process, even if those are totally unrelated to the issue at hand.
￿ Status quo bias, i.e. people attach di⁄erent values to identical goods depending on
whether they want to acquire or sell them.
￿ Loss aversion, i.e. asymmetric attitudes to (possible) gains and losses.
According to Simon (1986), ￿[t]he rationality of economics is substantive rationality,
while the rationality of psychology is procedural rationality￿ .18 Psychology, as the science
of behaviour, experience and consciousness, does not have any normative standards and is
oriented towards the explanation of actual behaviour. Because of this reason psychological
approaches are a suitable supplement to economic modelling, in order to arrive at a mean-
ingful representation of the expectations formation process. But how does the psychology
literature deal with expectations formation and the learning issue?
While economists are mainly interested in studying repeated situations to explain changes
in behaviour (that is: How does experience and social learning in￿ uence agents￿behaviour),
18This is in line with Tversky and Kahneman￿ s notion of ￿ framing￿ , where expectations depend on the
actual environment and circumstances and the expectations formation process is not a datum.
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psychologists usually focus on cognitive processes with little interest in studying repeated
situations only. Moreover, there exists a controversy in psychology over how best to theorize
human learning behaviour. In principle it is a question of weighing up the sociocultural vis-
a-vis the constructivist perspective of learning. Nonetheless there exists an agreement that
epistemological and ontological issues are di¢ cult to be separated in empirical examples, as
learning entails transformations both of the agent himself and of the social world encompass-
ing him. We will now brie￿ y introduce main aspects of the psychological literature, namely
motivational theories and social-psychology approaches.
Expected value theories of psychology are a subgroup of cognitive motivational theories
(see for instance Lewin (1926). They are usually based on the Bernoulli principle: An agent
chooses the alternative for which the expected utility is maximum. It is therefore not only
personal preferences which lets the agent decide but also the in￿ uence of his environment.
Memory and recall, recognition and attributes are therefore all relevant factors of human
decision making.
Attribution theories refer to the in￿ uence of attributes and their in￿ uence via expecta-
tions on action. B. Weiner (1974) is one of the leading authors in this ￿eld; according to his
theory of motivation and emotion, expectations are causally related to past results. That
means that a form of ￿ feedback￿is the main characterization underlying actions (see also box
2).
Box 2 - The Interaction in the
Expectations Formation
Process
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The social-cognitive personality theory of Bandura (i.e. a kind of social learning theory)
combines mental learning processes in interaction with the social environment of an actor.
Bandura￿ s theory entails two elementary propositions: Agents derive information for their
decisions via observing others which interacts with self-e¢ cacy. The latter term means that
an agent has to ￿gure out his own pro￿le, including his ability to carry out alternative ac-
tions. The action of an agent is therefore a product of his evaluation of personal capabilities,
his probabilistic assessment, and social learning behaviour. According to Bandura, expecta-
tions are checked and revised continuously with newly observed information coming along.
The evaluation of personal capabilities, however, is more sticky and conditional on actual
situations.
To conclude, approaches of motivational theories focus on the direct in￿ uence of decisions
and actions via expectations. In many psychological theories, we meet the familiar premise
of a ￿ rational man￿ , who calculates expected utilities. Social psychology theories in contrast,
highlight the importance of unconscious or even involuntary in￿ uences on agents￿decisions.
As the economics discipline, psychological research is fundamentally split between these two
strands and bringing together the two lines of research seems to be an advisable way to go.
C. On Least Squares Estimation and Adaptive Learning
In the adaptive learning approach economic agents behave like econometricians when
forecasting economic variables. The economy is in a temporary equilibrium in which the
current state of the economy depends on expectations about the future. In this annex we
want to build the bridge between least squares estimation and adaptive learning and show
that both concepts could be viewed as analogous for a wide range of models.
For illustration consider a model with a reduced form according to ,
yt = ￿txt + "t; (C.12)





: ￿ is an unknown parameter. Using the orthogonality condition for


















Consider agents having a perceived law of motion of the form
yt = b ￿txt + "t: (C.14)
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Note that the standard least squares regression can be represented in a recursive way for
appropriate initial conditions. We get










Rt = Rt￿1 + ￿t (xtx
0
t ￿ Rt￿1);
for initial conditions R0, ￿0 and ￿t being a suitable gain sequence.
Marcet and Sargent (1989) show that such dynamics ￿t into the framework of stochastic
recursive algorithms that can be evaluated by means of stochastic approximation methods
derived by Ljung (1977).19 One can then associate a di⁄erential equation T (￿) with the
recursive algorithm (C.15), s.t.
d￿
d￿
= T (￿ (￿)) ￿ ￿ (￿): (C.16)
So far, we only used a general representation for the recursive system (C.15) and did not
specify the gain sequence. For a decreasing gain sequence with ￿t = 1=t we get the OLS
estimate with all observations having the same weight. For a constant gain ￿t = ￿ it is still
possible to derive an associated di⁄erential equation T (￿) provided that the gain sequence
is a small positive constant;20 in this case pe
t+1 becomes an exponentially weighted average






D. A One-Country Case with Decreasing Gain Parameter
Consider the linearized version of the actual law of motion of equation (1.6),
19Let ￿ be a vector of unknown parameters and Xt a vector of exogenous state variables, s.t.we get a
recursive algorithm according to





where ￿t is a nonstochastic, decreasing gain sequence with the following properties:
1 X
t=1





which is given for decreasing gain sequences s.t. ￿t = 1=t: Q denotes in which way expectations are




where ￿ is notional time. Marcet and Sargent (1989) show that T (￿) is achieved by taking the limit
lim
t!1
EtQ(t;￿;Xt), where expectations are taken over the invariant distribution of Xt for a constant ￿: De-
riving the local stability conditions of the di⁄erential equation is then equivalent to the E-stability conditions:
20In this case ￿ will be sensitive to shocks even in the limit and will not converge to a particular value but
rather a limiting distribution (see Benveniste et al. (1990, Chapter 4) for details).
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where we substituted the assumption of a constant gain by a variable gain. For decreasing
gain with limt!1 ￿t = 0 and ￿￿t = 1: The steady state p is stable if z0 (p) < 1. Consider
￿rst the range 0 < z0 (p) < 1. For an initial point e pe
0 < p and z(￿) being a monotonically
increasing between e pe
0 and p; we get z(p) > p which implies pe
t+1 > p: Since the gain
parameter is assumed to be lower than one, it follows that pe
t+1 ￿ pe
t+1 > p: We now have
to show that pt actually converges to the steady state, that is limt!1 pt =b p=p: Suppose the




















￿i is a contradiction as ￿￿t = 1: ￿
E. Proof of Proposition 1.3 in Chapter 1
Choose an exchange rate e e 6= e; with the price sequence fe p1;t; e p2;tg; where e pi;t 6= pi;t for















M1;t + e eM2;t
M1;t + eM2;t
p1;t: (E.18)





If the money supply is nonstochastic in both countries, the price sequences fe p1;t; e p2;tg
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[M1;t+1 + e eM2;t+1]pi;t+1
=








= Ri;t; for i = A;B: (E.20)
Since savings decisions depend on the rate of return, both price sequences imply the
same savings decision. ￿
F. Proof of Existence of the Monetary Equilibrium in Chapter 1
If money has a zero value in the equilibrium at time t, no agent will demand it. Moreover,
if money is the only means of storage and its value is zero, every agent can only consume
from his individual endowment. This case is generally termed the non-monetary equilibrium.
Thus, for a monetary equilibrium to exist, money has to have a strictly positive value at
the equilibrium. Reconsider our maximization problem of young agents in equations (1.13)-
(1.15). Let ￿1 and ￿2 denote the nonnegative multipliers associated with the two constraints
(1.14) and (1.15) respectively. Agents maximize their utility by choosing consumption and
money holdings. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum are thus given by
1
ct
￿ ￿1 ￿ 0 (F.21)
1
ct+1
￿ ￿2 ￿ 0 (F.22)
￿￿1 + ￿2R
e
1;t+1 ￿ 0 (F.23)
￿￿1 + ￿2R
e
2;t+1 ￿ 0: (F.24)
Let ￿ ￿ u1=u2 de￿ne the marginal rate of substitution. By de￿nition of a monetary
equilibrium, we need that pt > 0 and Mi;t > 0 at least at one t: This implies by equations
(F.23) and (F.24) that pt > 0 for all t:
Equations (F.23)-(F.24) hold with equality, as we claim that money holdings are positive.
Equations (F.21)-(F.22) hold only with the weak inequality, as consumption at positive prices
can be zero.
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￿ ￿ 1 for i = 1;2 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence
of a monetary equilibrium.
Proof of Necessity. Suppose that the contrary holds, i.e. ￿
￿ > 1: Using the de￿nition
of the money supply process and the conditions Mi;t = NMi;t; where Mi;t are average money
holdings such that Mi;t = ￿Mh

















where qi;t ￿ pi;tMi;t are per capita money holdings. By using inequality ￿
￿ > 1 and















Since qi;t = pi;tMi;t < !1 for all t, no bounded qi;t can thus satisfy equation (F.27).
Proof of Su¢ ciency. We will show that ￿
￿ ￿ 1 implies a monetary equilibrium with
qh









where ￿ ￿ ￿ [!1 ￿ qt;qt+1]:
Consider a q 2 (0;!1) such that qi;t = qi;t+1 = q satis￿es the equality of equation
(F.28). The inequality is then implied by the assumption that ￿
￿ ￿ 1. Since ￿ is continuous,
lim
q!0￿ (q) = 0 and lim
q!!1￿ (q) = 1, which implies that such a q exists. This closes our proof.
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. A monetary equilibrium exists if -
for a given preference relation that supports savings behaviour - the money growth rate is
not too high.
For a given preference relation, we can moreover pin down the maximum ￿ that satis￿es
the inequality ￿
￿ ￿ 1 in a monetary equilibrium with adaptive learning behaviour. By using
equations (1.13)-(1.15)we can deduce that ￿ is bounded by
￿ =
￿
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G. Proof of Proposition 1.4 in Chapter 1
In order to show that the recursive system (1.31) converges, we linearize (1.31) and ￿nd
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at the steady state. The Jacobian is given by
J(p1;p2) =
 
1 + ￿(F1(p1;p2) ￿ 1) ￿F2(p1;p2)
￿G1(p1;p2) 1 + ￿(G2(p1;p2) ￿ 1)
!
; (G.29)
where Fi; Gi are the partial derivatives of equation (1.30) with respect to price i.
If the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are less than one in modulus, stability is guaranteed.
Checking these conditions is synonymous to
￿2 < Tr(J (p1;p2)) < 2 (G.30)
￿1 < Det(J (p1;p2)) < 1; (G.31)
where Tr denotes the trace of the matrix and Det the determinant.
To show (G.30) one can use the fact that
Tr(J (p1;p2)) = 1 + ￿(F1 (p1;p2) ￿ 1) + 1 + ￿(G2 (p1;p2) ￿ 1)








Tr(J (p1;p2)) < 2
,
1 + ￿(F1 (p1;p2) ￿ 1) + 1 + ￿(G2 (p1;p2) ￿ 1) < 2;
which is given by our assumption that F1 (p1;p2) < 1 and G2 (p1;p2) < 1:
To see that condition (G.31) holds as well, let us ￿rstly write down the determinate:
Det(J (p1;p2)) = [1 + ￿(F1 (p1;p2) ￿ 1)][1 + ￿(G2 (p1;p2) ￿ 1)]
￿￿
2F2 (p1;p2)G1 (p1;p2):
Using the de￿nitions of the functions G1 and F2, we can derive the following equation:
￿￿
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Note that





N!1 < 0; and






We now use again our assumption that F1 (p1;p2) < 1 and G2 (p1;p2) < 1, which gives
us the solution that the determinant is less than one.



















the determinant has to be bigger than -1.
Note that this convergence behaviour is independent of the level of ￿.
For the more the more general case we consider F1 (￿) < 1 and G2 (￿) < 1 not to hold.
One can show that condition (G.30) is still ful￿lled in that case, while the condition for the
















￿ ￿ ￿2 + ￿2!2 ; (G.32)
where S denotes world aggregate savings.
As one can infer from (G.32), convergence now depends on both ￿ and ￿ in the hyperbolic
way exhibited in ￿gure 3. Inequality (G.32) describes the stability frontier. For the parameter
values employed in our simulation exercise, the stability frontier is depicted in ￿gure 3.

















For our parameter choice of section 4 this inequality is ful￿lled for i = 1;2.￿
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HF i g u r e s
Figure 1a – Weekly Percentage Chang#es, Nominal DEM-USD Exchange Rate
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Figure 1b – Monthly Percentage Changes, Nominal DEM-USD Exchange Rate
Figure 1c – Quarterly Percentage Changes, Nominal DEM-USD Exchange Rate
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Figure 2 – Estimated Densities of Weekly, Monthly and Quaterly German Mark-
U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Returns
Note: Data are German mark-U.S. dollar exchange rates  for 1979.1-1998.12; estimated
densities are plotted against the normal distribution
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Figure 3 – Stability and Instability Regions with Adaptive Learning
(Parameter Values equal those of the simulation analysis of section 4, i.e.
N = 30, w1 = 200, w2 = 50, M1,0 = 100, M2,0 = 110).
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Figure 4 – Instability Region (θ = 3, α = 0.5)
(The y-axis of the average utility level is multiplied by 100)
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Figure 5 – Instability Region (θ = 7, α = 0.1)
(The y-axis of the average utility level is multiplied by 100)
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Figure 6 – Instability Region (θ = 7, α = 0.5)
(The y-axis of the average utility level is multiplied by 100)
Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2007),Three Implications of Learning Behaviour for Price Processes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11573H.. FIGURES 107
Figure 7 – Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Function of
Simulated Exchange Rate Forecast Errors
Note: ACF (light grey), PCAF (dark grey); parameter values employed are
those of figure 5.
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Figure 8 – Lithuania: CPI Rates, GDP, M2 and the Discount Rate
Note: Data are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. CPI is measured on the left y-axis, while
all variables are measured on the right y-axis.
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Figure 9 – Poland: CPI Rates, GDP, M2 and the Discount Rate
Note: Data are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. CPI is measured on the left y-axis, while
all variables are measured on the right y-axis.
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Figure 10 – Slovenia: CPI Rates, GDP, M2 and the Discount Rate
Note: Data are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. CPI is measured on the left y-axis, while
all variables are measured on the right y-axis.
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Figure 11 – Breakpoint Chow Test (Lithuania)
Figure 12 – Breakpoint Chow Test (Poland)
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Figure 13 – Breakpoint Chow Test (Slovenia)
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Figure 14 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the




N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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Figure 15 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the




N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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Figure 16 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the




N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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Figure 17 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the




N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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Figure 18 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the




N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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Figure 19 - Impulse Responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in the





N.B. The vertical axes are approximately
percentage deviation, except for the interest
rate, while the horizontal axis is the number of
months.
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      Table 1 - Volatility of the ∆ Log German Mark- U.S.
          Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (1979-1998)
    Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.10,
various volumes; data are end of period spot rates.
standard deviation
monthly data
German to U.S. interest rate differential 0.0293
log German to U.S. industrial production 0.0942
log German to U.S. prices 0.0880
quarterly data
German to U.S. interest rate differential 0.0291
log German to U.S. industrial production 0.0935
log German to U.S. prices 0.0881
log German to U.S. M0 0.1039
log German to U.S. national income 0.1012
Table 2 – Standard Deviation of ∆ Log Fundamentals (1979-1998)
Source: All data from IMF International Financial Statistics, various volumes; interest rates are end of period discount rates, prices are
CPI averages (base year=1995), M0 consists of the components money and quasi-money; national income is GNI.
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weekly data Skewness             0.031079
Excess Kurtosis   5.8261
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   266.20
[0.0000]**
monthly data Skewness              0.11975
Excess Kurtosis    3.3322
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   74.136 [0.0485]*
quaterly data Skewness             -0.072551
Excess Kurtosis    0.0507
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   18.606
[0.0001]**
Table 3a – Normality Tests for the German Mark-U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Returns
(1979-1998)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various volumes; Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.10; two stars indicate that the test is




1 t-adf   -0.187
∆ log spot rate
1 t-adf   -4.092**
monthly data
log spot rate
2 t-adf   -0.518
∆ log spot rate
2 t-adf   -14.19**
quaterly data
log spot rate
3 t-adf   -0.302
 ∆ log spot rate
3 t-adf   -7.927**
Table 3b – Stationarity Tests (ADF) for the German Mark-U.S.
Dollar Exchange Rate (1979-1998)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, various volumes
1Critical values (5%=-1.95 1%=-2.65); 2  Critical values (5%=-1.94 1%=-2.57);
3  Critical values (5%=-1.94 1%=-2.59)
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standard deviation
θ = 2.2, α = 0.5 0.0196
θ = 7, α = 0.1 0.0201
θ = 7, α = 0.5 0.0216
Table 4 - Volatility of the Simulated Exchange Rate
Series (non-convergence case)
Note: We employ standard values of chapter 4 for all other parameters.
simulated data
(θ = 7, α = 0.5)
Skewness             0.019812
Excess Kurtosis   3.6170
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   142.39 [0.0000]**
Table 5 – Normality Tests for the Simulated Exchange Rate Returns
Note: Two stars indicate that the test is significant at the 1% level.
ADF test statistics
simulated data
(θ = 7, α = 0.5)
log rate
1 t-adf   -0.992
 ∆ log rate
1
t-adf   -44.86**
     Table 6 – Stationarity Tests (ADF) for the Simulated Exchange Rate Data
1  Critical values (5%=-1.94 1%=-2.57)
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γ t-value F-test
simulated data




Table 7 – OLS Regression of Forecast Error on Lagged Forecast Error
Note: We omit the estimates for the constant term here to conserve space. Two stars indicate that the test is significant at
the 1% level, one star that it is significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are given in the curved paranthesis.
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Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia
1989 10 n.a. 1,5 n.a. 18,1 n.a.
1990 72,5 136 18,4 n.a. 33,4 n.a.
1991 338,9 249,8 52 303,8 32,3 262,4
1992 79,4 938,2 12,7 953,5 21,6 959
1993 63,8 1517,5 18,2 35,6 21,1 35,6
1994 121,9 -3 9,7 42 21,2 42
1995 32,9 3,8 7,9 29 28,3 29
1996 310,8 3,4 8,6 15 19,8 15
1997 578,6 3,8 10 12,5 18,4 12,5
1998 22,2 5,4 10,7 8,1 14,3 4,7
1999 0,7 4,2 2,1 3,3 10 2,4
2000 9,9 6,2 3,9 4 9,8 2,6
Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia Russia
1989 n.a. 639,5 0,6 1,5 2772 n.a.
1990 n.a. 249 37,7 18,4 104,6 n.a.
1991 345 60,4 222,8 58,3 247,1 161
1992 1161,1 44,3 199,2 9,1 92,9 2506,1
1993 188,8 37,6 295,5 25,1 22,8 840
1994 45 29,4 61,7 11,7 19 204,4
1995 35,5 21,6 27,8 7,2 9 128,6
1996 13,1 18,5 56,9 5,4 9 21,8
1997 7 13,2 151,4 6,4 8,8 10,9
1998 5,1 11,8 59,1 6,7 7,9 27,6
1999 0,8 7,3 45,8 10,6 6,1 86,1
2000 1 10,1 45,7 12 8,9 20,8
Table 8 – Changes in Annual Consumer Price Inflation Rates (in %)
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various volumes.
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Lag order according to AIC
Lithuania 2
Poland 2 or 3
Slovenia 2 or 3
Table 9 – Determination of VAR Lag Length
Lithuania Poland Slovenia
Data Sample 01/93 – 12/00 01/91 – 12/00 01/92 – 12/00
Mean 94.095 66.677 16.197
Standard Deviation 189.37 31.241 12.972
Skewness 2.5395 -0.22673 2.2898
Excess Kurtosis 5.2286 -1.3431 7.2623
Normality Test 364.14 [0.0000]** 6.3789 [0.0412]* 80.379 [0.0000]**
Table 10 - Descriptive Statistics of the Inflation Rates in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia





Table 11 – Kalman Gain in Lithuania, Poland
   and Slovenia
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